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Chapter 1
Preface
This thesis is about the construction, analysis and implementation of efficient public-
key cryptosystems. The public-key cryptosystem which is used most frequently
throughout the world is the RSA cryptosystem [RSA78] [PKCS]. As an alternative
to the RSA cryptosystem, elliptic curve cryptosystems have been introduced [Kob87]
[Mil86]. Here we are interested in constructing new public-key cryptosystems which
are different from both the RSA cryptosystem and elliptic curve cryptosystems.
The theoretical foundation for the construction of a public-key cryptosystem is the
following statement: A public-key cryptosystem has an encryption function E and a
decryption function D which are published for all persons. Each person has a public
key e and the corresponding secret key d. When person B wishes to send a message
m to person A, then B uses the public-key eA of A to encrypt m:
c = EeA(m), E : a encryption function with eA. (1.1)
Ciphertext c is sent to person B possibly through an open network. Then person A
decrypts the ciphertext c using the secret key dA which only person A knows:
m = DdA(c), D : a decryption function with dA. (1.2)
Here we have the relationship m = DdA(EeA(m)). All persons can compute EeA(·)
using the public key eA, but the only person who can execute DdA(·) is A. Using
this mechanism, we can distribute secret keys securely over the open network.
From a computational point of view, it is an interesting problem to find public key
cryptosystems. The following criteria should be satisfied:
1. Generating a pair of a public key e and a corresponding secret key d should
be efficient, i.e., polynomial time.
2. Both to compute the secret key d for a given public key e and to compute
the message m for a given ciphertext Ee(m) without knowing d should be
computationally infeasible.
1
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3. Encryption function E and decryption function D should be sufficiently effi-
cient, i.e., polynomial time where the degree of the polynomial is ≤ 3.
The construction of a public-key cryptosystem currently requires the use of a num-
ber theoretical structure. For example, the RSA cryptosystem is constructed over
the integer ring ZZ/nZZ, where n is a product of two primes. Elliptic curve cryptosys-
tems are constructed over elliptic curves over some finite fields IFn, where usually
n is either a prime or a power of 2. After the appearance of the RSA cryptosys-
tem, many mathematicians and cryptographers have become interested in finding
another suitable structure for a public-key cryptosystem, and many public-key cryp-
tosystems have been proposed such as the McEliece cryptosystem [Mc78], the knap-
sack cryptosystems [MH78] [CR88], the quadratic field cryptosystem [BW88], or
the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem [AD97]. However these public-key cryptosystems
have over time become already impractical compared with the RSA cryptosystem
or the elliptic curve cryptosystem. This is due to the invention of faster cryptanaly-
sis algorithms, which have been derived from new results of computational number
theory [MvOV97] [N00]. It is a very interesting problem to construct a public-key
cryptosystem with a new trapdoor, which is based on a different number theoretical
structure.
The decryption function of the RSA cryptosystem or an elliptic curve cryptosystem
involve exponentiation of an element, which is a relatively slow computation, i.e.,
polynomial time with a polynomial of degree = 3. It has been said that compu-
tation of their decryption functions is generally more than 100 times slower than
that of typical symmetry-key cryptosystem. In addition, for the sake of high se-
curity it is desirable to store the secret keys on a smart card and to carry out the
decryption computation on the smart card. A smart card has limited computational
resources, and one often needs a costly coprocessor which helps with calculation of
the decryption functions. On the contrary we do not have to use a coprocessor to
implement a symmetry-key cryptosystem on a smart card. Currently smart cards
that are used for a large scale market such, as cash cards or SIM cards for mobile
phones, do not use a public-key cryptosystem because of the high cost. Therefore,
we desire a public-key cryptosystem with fast decryption, i.e., polynomial time with
a polynomial of degree = 2.
Contributions of this Thesis
In this doctoral thesis, we propose three public-key cryptosystems with fast de-
cryption function: the NICE cryptosystem, the PkQ cryptosystem and the
Nk cryptosystem. The NICE cryptosystem is constructed over non-maximal
quadratic orders [PT00]. The PkQ cryptosystem is constructed over ZZ/pkqZZ,
where p, q are primes and k is a positive integer [Tak98]. The Nk cryptosystem
is constructed over ZZ/nkZZ, where n is the RSA-modulus and k is a positive integer
3[Tak97]. These three public-key cryptosystems are not only of theoretical interest
but also practical one. The NICE cryptosystem and the PkQ cryptosystem are
suitable for implementation on smartcards.
The NICE cryptosystem is constructed over quadratic orders [PT00]. The NICE
cryptosystem has two interesting properties. The first property is that the trapdoor
mechanism is different from previously reported public-key cryptosystems such as
RSA cryptosystem [RSA78] and elliptic curve cryptosystems [Kob87] [Mil86]. The
second property is that the decryption process of the NICE cryptosystem is very
fast. It is of quadratic bit complexity in the length of the public key, i.e., polynomial
time with a polynomial of degree = 2. The NICE cryptosystem is the only known
public-key cryptosystem whose decryption has quadratic polynomial time. Our im-
plementation shows that with regards to the decryption time, it is comparably as
fast as the encryption time of the RSA cryptosystem with small encryption expo-
nent e = 216 + 1. The security of our cryptosystem is closely related to factoring the
discriminant of a quadratic order. When we choose appropriate sizes of the parame-
ters, the currently known fast algorithms for cryptanalysis such as the number field
sieve [LL91], the elliptic curve method [Len87], or the Hafner-McCurley algorithm
[HM89] are not applicable.
The PkQ cryptosystem is constructed over ZZ/pkqZZ, where p, q are primes and k
is a positive integer [Tak98]. The prominent property of the PkQ cryptosystem
is its decryption time. It is about three times faster than implementations of the
RSA cryptosystem that use the Chinese remainder theorem [QC82] [PKCS]. Indeed,
timings for implementations using LiDIA [LiD95] show that the PkQ cryptosystem
is about 2.4 times faster than the RSA cryptosystem with the Chinese remain-
der theorem. The security of the PkQ cryptosystem is closely related to the RSA
cryptosystem. We prove that standard attacks against the RSA cryptosystem, for
examples, the cycling attack [WS79] and the low decryption exponent attack [Wie90]
are not applicable to the PkQ cryptosystem. Moreover, to implement the PkQ cryp-
tosystem we do not have to prepare extra cryptographic libraries; instead, we can
use the standard one for the RSA cryptosystem. We can easily implement the PkQ
cryptosystem in an environment designed for the RSA cryptosystem.
The Nk cryptosystem is constructed over ZZ/nkZZ, where n is the RSA modulus and
k is a positive integer [Tak97]. The features of the Nk cryptosystem are as follows:
We can encrypt a message which is several time larger than the RSA modulus. We
can prove that breaking the second block of the Nk cryptosystems is as hard as
breaking the original RSA cryptosystem. To implement the Nk cryptosystems, we
used only ordinary and elementary mathematical techniques such as computation of
greatest common divisors, so that it is easy to implement. Moreover, the decryption
time of the first block is dominant, because after the first block we only calculate
the modular multiplication of the encryption exponent and an extended Euclidean
algorithm to decrypt blocks after the first one. Therefore the Nk cryptosystem
is faster compared with the previously reported RSA-type cryptosystems [Dem94]
[KMOV92] [Koy95] [LKBS92] [MM96] [SE96]. Even if a message is several times
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longer than a public-key n, we can encrypt the message fast without additionally
using a symmetry-key cryptosystem.
Recent related works
In the following we report several recent works related to my doctor thesis.
The NICE cryptosystem is constructed over quadratic orders O∆q , where ∆q = ∆1q2
is a non-fundamental discriminant, ∆1 is the fundamental discriminant of ∆q, and
q is a prime. The security of the NICE cryptosystem is based on the factoring
problem of the non-fundamental discriminant ∆q = ∆1q
2. On the other hand,
a public-key cryptosystem based on the discrete logarithm problem of the class
group Cl(∆) has also proposed [BW88]. Vollmer rigorously proved that the discrete
logarithm problem can be solved in time L|∆|[12 ,
3
4
√
2] under the generalized Riemann
hypothesis assumption [Vo00]. Hamdy and Mo¨ller investigated the required size of
the discriminants for cryptographic purposes [HM00]. They estimate that the time
to factor a 1024-bit RSA modulus by the number field sieve is equivalent to the
time to solve the discrete logarithm problem of the class group Cl(∆) with a 687-bit
discriminant ∆. Hu¨hnlein and Takagi proved that if a discriminant ∆q = ∆1q
2 is
a totally non-fundamental discriminant, i.e. h(∆1) = 1 then the discrete logarithm
problem of the class group Cl(∆q) can be reduced to that of the finite group IFq2
[HT99]. Using this reduction, Hu¨hnlein proposed a digital signature scheme over
Cl(−8q2) with a fast signature generation process [Hu99]. His implementation shows
that it is faster than the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [DSA94] with the same
security parameter size.
The PkQ cryptosystem is constructed over ZZ/pkqZZ, where p, q are primes and
k = 2, 3, .... Recently, Lim at el. extended it to the modulus prqs(r, s = 2, 3, ...)
[LKLY00]. RSA Laboratories presented Multi-Prime RSA in Public-Key Cryptog-
raphy Standards #1 version 2.0 Amendment [PKCS]. Multi-Prime RSA uses the
product of more than two primes as RSA modulus. Multi-Prime RSA with 3 primes
is about 9 times faster than the original RSA cryptosystem (See also Section 3.4).
Boneh, Durfee, and Howgrave-Graham present an algorithm for factoring integers
of the form n = pkq for large k [BDH-G99]. The algorithm runs in time polynomial
in log n if k is close to log p. The algorithm dose not work for the 1024-bit modulus
n = p2q with 341-bit primes p and q, because 2 is much smaller than log p. Boneh and
Durfee extended the Wiener’s attack (see Section 3.6) using lattice reduction theory
[BD00]. The secret exponent d with d < n0.292 can be heuristically detected. They
conjecture that the bound would be eventually improved to d < n0.5. It is an open
problem how we apply the Boneh-Durfee method to the relation ed ≡ 1 mod ϕ(pkq),
where ϕ(pkq) = pk−1(p− 1)(q − 1).
The Nk cryptosystem is constructed over ZZ/nkZZ, where n is the RSA modulus and
k = 2, 3, ..... The Nk cryptosystem is considered a multi-block mode usage of the
5RSA cryptosystem. The most famous single-block mode of the RSA cryptosystem is
the OAEP which is used in the Public-Key Cryptography Standards #1 version 2.0
[PKCS]. Using the OAEP we can prove that the RSA cryptosystem is semantically
secure against adaptive chosen message attacks under the random oracle model.
Recently Pointcheval proposed a multi-block mode of the RSA cryptosystem based
on the dependent-RSA problem [Po99]. The dependent-RSA problem is a problem
to distinguish two distributions in ZZ/nZZ× ZZ/nZZ:
(ae mod n, be mod n), (ae mod n, (a+ 1)e mod n)
where n is the RSA modulus, e is a public exponent of the RSA, and a, b are random
elements of ZZ/nZZ. Pointcheval’s cryptosystem can be proven semantically secure
against adaptive chosen message attacks under the dependent RSA problem and
the random oracle model. Paillier proposed a public-key cryptosystem based on
composite degree residuosity classes [Pa99]. The trapdoor of the cryptosystem is
an extension of the EPOC cryptosystem [OU98] to the ring ZZ/n2ZZ, where n is a
product of two primes. The intractability to break this cryptosystem is based on
the composite residuosity problem: to find the integer x for given g, n, gxrn mod n2,
where g, r ∈ (ZZ/n2ZZ)× with n|ordn2(g). Paillier and Pointcheval proposed a variant
of the Paillier cryptosystem that can be proven semantically secure against adaptive
chosen message attacks [PP99]. For the Nk cryptosystem we proved that the oracle
which computes the second block of a plaintext can also break the first block of it.
However it is an open problem whether we can prove that the Nk cryptosystem is
semantically secure against adaptive chosen attackers under some assumptions like
the Pointcheval cryptosystem and the Paillier-Pointcheval cryptosystem.
This thesis is organized as follows.
In Chapter 2, we present the NICE cryptosystem. At first we review the arithmetic
of non-maximal quadratic orders and we show several algorithms used in the NICE
cryptosystem. In Section 2.3, key generation, encryption and decryption are ex-
plained. We also analyze the security of the NICE cryptosystem. In Section 2.5 we
show the timings of implementation by software. In Section 2.6 we also show the
timings of implementation by a smartcard.
In Chapter 3 we propose the PkQ cryptosystem. In Section 3.2 we describe the
algorithm of the PkQ cryptosystem. Then the running time of its decryption algo-
rithm is estimated. We also discuss the security of the PkQ cryptosystem, especially
factoring algorithms for the modulus p2q and the short secret exponent attack.
In Chapter 4 we present the Nk cryptosystem and analyze its security. Indeed we
prove that deciphering the entire plaintext of this system is as intractable as breaking
the RSA cryptosystem. We also analyze the efficiency of the Nk cryptosystem. The
decrypting process is faster than any other multi-block RSA-type cryptosystem ever
reported.
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Chapter 2
NICE Cryptosystem
We present a new cryptosystem based on ideal arithmetic in quadratic orders. The
method of our trapdoor is different from the Diffie-Hellman key distribution scheme
or the RSA cryptosystem. The plaintext m is encrypted by mpr, where p is a fixed
element and r is a random integer, so our proposed cryptosystem is a probabilistic
encryption scheme and has the homomorphy property. The most prominent property
of our cryptosystem is the cost of the decryption, which is of quadratic bit complexity
in the length of the public key. Our implementation shows that it is comparably as
fast as the encryption time of the RSA cryptosystem with e = 216 + 1. The security
of our cryptosystem is closely related to factoring the discriminant of a quadratic
order. When we choose appropriate sizes of the parameters, the currently known
fast algorithms, for examples, the elliptic curve method, the number field sieve, the
Hafner-McCurley algorithm, are not applicable.
2.1 Introduction
Plenty of public key cryptosystems have been proposed, and the Diffie-Hellman key
distribution scheme or the RSA cryptosystem are mostly used throughout the world
[DH76] [RSA78]. Typically, these public key cryptosystems involve a modular ex-
ponentiation with a large number, which is of cubic bit complexity in the bit length
of the public key and its computation is relatively slow. On the other side, for the
sake of high security the secret keys are stored on a smart card and the decryption
computation is also carried out over the smart card. So a cryptosystem with fast
decryption is desired. To our knowledge, there exists no practical public key cryp-
tosystem which has quadratic decryption time. In this chapter, we present a new
cryptosystem with fast decryption time. The decryption is of quadratic bit complex-
ity; it involves an extended Euclidean algorithm computation, an ideal reduction and
a few basic operations like multiplication and division with remainder of numbers.
7
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By the experiment of our implementation, our cryptosystem is comparably as fast
as the encryption time of the RSA cryptosystem with e = 216 + 1.
Our cryptosystem is constructed over an imaginary quadratic field. Buchmann and
Williams proposed the first algorithm which achieves the Diffie-Hellman key distri-
bution scheme using the class group in an imaginary quadratic field [BW88]. Later,
Hafner and McCurley discovered the sub-exponential algorithm against the discrete
logarithm problem of the class group [HM89]. Since then cryptosystems over class
groups have not gained much attention in practice. Recently, Hu¨hnlein et. al. pro-
posed an ElGamal-type public key cryptosystem with faster decryption process in
class groups of imaginary quadratic fields [HJPT98]. Here we call it the HJPT cryp-
tosystem. Denote by Cl(∆q) and Cl(∆1) the class group of the non-maximal order
and that of the maximal order respectively. The technique used in HJPT cryptosys-
tem is to “switch” the ideals between Cl(∆q) and Cl(∆1). Note that the arithmetic
of the switching is fast i.e., has quadratic complexity in the bit length of the public
key. Nevertheless, the HJPT cryptosystem has cubic decryption time because it is
an ElGamal type public key cryptosystem and involves an exponentiation step. In
our case, we encrypt the plaintext m by E(m, r) = mpr, where p is an element in the
kernel of the map Cl(∆q)→ Cl(∆1) and r is a random integer. By this encryption,
the decryption process only involves the switching arithmetic, so the decryption has
quadratic complexity in the bit length of the public key. The encryption process
E(m, r) = mpr induces that our cryptosystem uses a probabilistic encryption and
the homomorphy property.
The security of our cryptosystem is based upon a new number theoretic prob-
lem over quadratic orders which is closely related to factoring the discriminant
∆q = −pq2. When we choose appropriate sizes of the parameters, the currently
known fast algorithms like the elliptic curve method [Len87], the number field sieve
[LL91] and the Hafner-McCurley algorithm [HM89] are not applicable. We also
discuss the chosen ciphertext attack. In our cryptosystem, the surjective one way
map Cl(∆q) → Cl(∆1) plays an important role. As related public key cryptosys-
tems which uses such a surjective map, two public key cryptosystems are known:
Shamir’s RSA for paranoids which uses (ZZ/nZZ)∗ → (ZZ/pZZ)∗(n = pq) [Sha95] and
the Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem which uses (ZZ/nZZ)∗ → (ZZ/pZZ)+(n = p2q)
[OU98]. The chosen ciphertext attack is applicable to both public key cryptosys-
tems, and the attacker can easily factor the public modulus n (See, for example,
[GGOQ98]). Against our cryptosystem, Jaulmes and Joux also proposed a chosen-
message attack for known two pair of messages [JJ99].
The chapter is organized as follows: we first recall the basic notions of class groups
of quadratic orders and describe how to “switch” from the non-maximal order to the
maximal order and vice-versa. We then present the new cryptosystem and analyze
its security. Finally, we give some timings comparing our new cryptosystem with
RSA.
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2.2 Quadratic Orders
There are plenty of cryptographic primitives using quadratic fields and several public
key cryptosystems are proposed [BW90]. We briefly explain the class group of a
quadratic order. A more complete treatment may be found in [Cox89].
Let ∆ ∈ ZZ not a square such that ∆ ≡ 0, 1 (mod 4). We call ∆ a (quadratic)
discriminant. ∆ is called a fundamental discriminant if ∆ ≡ 1 (mod 4) and is
square-free, or ∆/4 ≡ 2, 3 (mod 4) and is square-free. Every discriminant ∆ can be
represented by ∆1f
2, where ∆1 is a fundamental discriminant and f is an integer,
and we denote ∆f = ∆1f
2. We consider only negative discriminants in this chapter.
Let
√
∆f = i
√
|∆f | be the square root of ∆f on the upper half plane. Then we call
O∆f = ZZ +
∆f+
√
∆f
2
ZZ the quadratic order of discriminant ∆f . It is an integral
domain. If ∆f is not a fundamental discriminant then O∆f ⊂ O∆1 and O∆f has
finite index f in O∆1 . Moreover, we have O∆f = ZZ+fO∆1 . The order O∆f is called
the non-maximal order with conductor f , and the order O∆1 is called the maximal
order. Every element α ∈ O∆f is represented by α = (x + y
√
∆f )/2, x, y ∈ ZZ. For
α = (x + y
√
∆f )/2, we denote by α
′ = (x − y
√
∆f )/2 its (complex) conjugate.
The norm of α is defined as N(α) = αα′ = (x2 − y2∆f )/4. A subset a of O∆f is
an (integral) ideal of O∆f if α + β ∈ a whenever α, β ∈ a, and α(∆f +
√
∆f )/2 ∈ a
whenever α ∈ a. Every ideal a of O∆f is given by
a = m
aZZ + b+
√
∆f
2
ZZ
 , (2.1)
where m ∈ ZZ, a ∈ ZZ>0, and b ∈ ZZ such that b2 ≡ ∆f (mod 4a). This expression is
unique if we choose −a < b ≤ a. Then (m, a, b) is called the standard representation
of a. The norm of an ideal a is defined by N(a) = am. a is said to be primitive if
m = 1. In that case, we represent a by (a, b). For two given ideals a, b, we can define
their product ab (see, for example, [BW88]). The computation of a representation
of ab needs O((log(max{N(a), N(b)}))2) bit operations.
We describe the class group ofO∆f . An ideal a is called prime to f if GCD(N(a), f) =
1 holds. The ideals of O∆f prime to f form an Abelian group; denote it by I∆f (f).
Two ideals a and b are called equivalent if there is a α ∈ O∆f such that a = αb.
Denote by a ∼ b this equivalence relation. For an element γ ∈ O∆f the ideal
γO∆f is called a principal ideal. The principal ideals P∆f (f) which are prime to
f form a subgroup of I∆f (f). The quotient group I∆f (f)/P∆f (f) is called the
class group of O∆f ; denote it by Cl(∆f ). The order of this group is denoted by
h(∆f ). For a primitive ideal a in I∆f (f), we say that a = (a, b) is reduced if
|b| ≤ a ≤ c = (b2 −∆f )/4a and additionally b ≥ 0 if a = c or a = |b|. There is only
one reduced ideal in every equivalence class. Denote by Red∆f (a) the reduced ideal
equivalent to a ∈ I∆f (f). An algorithm to compute Red∆f (a) from a is described
in [BW88] and requires O((log(N(a)))2) bit operations. We identify each class of the
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class group with the unique reduced ideal. It is easy to verify that N(a) <
√
|∆f |/3
holds for every reduced ideal a ∈ I∆f (f). Conversely, a primitive ideal a ∈ I∆f (f)
with small norm such that N(a) <
√
|∆f |/4 is always a reduced ideal. It turns out
that we can compute the representation of the product of two classes of the class
group in O((log
√
|∆f |)2) bit operations. See [BB97].
2.2.1 The map Cl(∆q)→ Cl(∆1)
In [Cox89], the relationship between ideals in the maximal order O∆1 and in the
non-maximal order O∆f is investigated. If a is an ideal in I∆f (f) then A = aO∆1
is an ideal in I∆1(f) and N(a) = N(A). Similarly, if A is an ideal in I∆1(f) then
a = A∩O∆f is an ideal in I∆f (f) and N(A) = N(a). The map φ : a 7→ aO∆1 induces
an isomorphism I∆f (f) ∼→I∆1(f). The inverse of this map is φ−1 : A 7→ A ∩ O∆f .
Let f = q be a prime and
√
|∆1|/3 < q. Then all the reduced ideals in Cl(∆1) are
prime to the conductor q [HJPT98]. Thus we can consider the following map based
on φ:
ϕq : Cl(∆q) −→ Cl(∆1)
a 7−→ Red∆1(aO∆1),
where we identify a class of both class groups with the unique reduced ideal in that
class. (Note that if q >
√
|∆1|/3 we also can define this map; we possibly have to
compute an ideal equivalent to a which is prime to q. See [HJPT98].) A practical
algorithm to compute ϕq is as follows:
1. Algorithm (GoToMaxOrder)
Input: A reduced ideal a = (a, b) ∈ Cl(∆q), the discriminant ∆q the fundamental
discriminant ∆1, and the conductor q
Output: A reduced ideal A = ϕq(a) = (A,B).
1. A← a
2. bO ← ∆q mod 2
3. Solve 1 = µq + λa for µ, λ ∈ ZZ using the extended Euclidean algorithm
4. B ← bµ+ abOλ mod 2a
5. (A,B)← Red∆1(A,B)
6. RETURN (A,B)
Note that the map GoToMaxOrder is different from the map described in [HJPT98].
Every step of this algorithm requires O((log
√
|∆q|)2) bit operations, thus the com-
plexity of this algorithm is quadratic.
We discuss the “inverse” map ϕ−1q . The map ϕq : Cl(∆q)→ Cl(∆1) is surjective and
we have h(∆q) = h(∆1) (q − (∆1/q)), where (∆1/q) is the Kronecker-symbol (See,
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for example, [Cox89]). Denote by Ker(ϕq) the kernel of the map ϕq : Cl(∆q) →
Cl(∆1) which is a cyclic subgroup of Cl(∆q) with order q − (∆1/q). So there is
a (q − (∆1/q))-fold ambiguity for the inverse of the map ϕq. We will distinguish a
unique reduced ideal from these preimages using the size of the norm of an ideal. The
norm of any reduced ideal in Cl(∆1) is smaller than
√
|∆1|/3. By our assumption√
|∆1|/3 < q all ideals in Cl(∆1) are prime to the conductor q. Therefore for a
reduced ideal A in Cl(∆1) a = φ
−1(A) = A ∩ O∆q is a primitive ideal in I∆q(q),
and N(A) = N(a). If the primitive ideal a in I∆q(q) satisfies N(a) <
√
|∆1|/4,
then both a an A are reduced ideals. Consequently, if we restrict ourselves to ideals
a in Cl(∆q) such that N(a) <
√
|∆1|/4, then ϕq(a) ∩ O∆q is reduced (in I∆q(q))
and so we can compute a distinguished inverse of the map ϕq, namely a. Note that
the cardinality of this set is smaller than that of Cl(∆1). We denote by ϕ
−1
q this
restricted inverse map and the practical algorithm to compute the map ϕ−1q is as
follows:
2. Algorithm (Inverse)
Input: A reduced ideal A = (A,B) ∈ Cl(∆1) such that N(A) <
√
|∆1|/4, the
conductor q
Output: A reduced ideal a ∈ Cl(∆q) such that ϕ−1q (A) = a = (a, b).
1. a← A
2. b← Bq mod 2a
3. RETURN (a, b)
This algorithm obviously requires only O((log(
√
|∆1|))2) bit operations.
2.3 NICE cryptosystem
Generate two random primes p, q > 4 such that p ≡ 3 (mod 4) and let ∆1 = −p. Let
Cl(∆1) be the class group of the maximal order with discriminant ∆1 and Cl(∆q)
be the class group of the non-maximal order with conductor q. ∆q will be public,
whilst its factorization into ∆1 and q will be kept private. The discriminant ∆1 and
the conductor q are large primes to prevent breaking the cryptosystem by factoring
∆q.
In the key generation, we choose an ideal p from the kernel Ker(ϕq) and make p
public. The message ideal m is an reduced ideal in Cl(∆q) with norm smaller
than b
√
|∆1|/4c. The encryption is carried over the class group Cl(∆q) by com-
puting Red∆q(mp
r), where r is a random integer smaller than q − (∆1/q). Then,
by the knowledge of the conductor, we can go to the maximal order and the im-
age of the message ideal ϕq(m) in the maximal order is revealed, since ϕq(mp
r) =
ϕq(m)ϕq(p
r) = ϕq(m)O∆1 = ϕq(m). We can recover the message by computing the
unique preimage of ϕq(m), namely m = ϕ
−1
q (ϕ(m)).
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1. Key generation: Generate two random primes p, q > 4 with p ≡ 3 (mod 4)
and
√
p/3 < q. Let ∆1 = −p and ∆q = ∆1q2. Let k and l be the bit lengths of
b
√
|∆1|/4c and q − (∆1/q) respectively. Choose an ideal p in Cl(∆q), where
ϕq(p) is a principal ideal in O∆1 . (2.2)
Then (p,∆q, k, l) are the system parameters, and ∆1, q are the secret keys.
2. Encryption: Let m be the plaintext, where m is a reduced ideal in Cl(∆q) with
log2 N(m) < k. Pick up a random l − 1 bit integer and we encrypt the plaintext
as follows using binary exponentiation techniques:
c = Red∆q(mp
r) (2.3)
Then c is the cipher ideal.
3. Decryption: Using the secret keys ∆1, q, we compute K = GoToMaxOrder(c).
The plaintext m can be recovered by computing m = Inverse(K).
The embedding of a number into a message ideal may be simply done as follows: let
x be a message and t be a random number of length k− 2−blog2 xc. Denote by x.t
the concatenation of x and t as bitstrings. We determine the smallest prime l larger
than x.t with (∆q/l) = 1. It follows log2 l < k−1. This can be done effectively using
a few trials of a primality test and Jacobi symbol computations. Then, compute
b such that ∆q ≡ b2 mod 4l,−l < b ≤ l. This can also be done effectively using
the RESSOL algorithm of Shanks [Sha89]. Then a = (l, b) is a reduced ideal with
log2 N(a) < k.
The key generation simply works as follows: choose a number α ∈ O∆1 with norm
less than
√
|∆q|/4, compute the standard representation of the ideal αO∆1 and
compute p = φ−1(αO∆1). This is explained in [HJPT98]. Then p ∈ kerϕq. The en-
cryption takes O((log
√
|∆q|)3) bit operations because of the binary exponentiation.
The decryption involves two algorithms of quadratic complexity, so it requires only
O((log
√
|∆q|)2) bit operations.
2.4 Security considerations
The security of our cryptosystem depends on the difficulty of factoring the discrim-
inant ∆q. If the discriminant ∆q can be factored, our proposed cryptosystem is
completely broken. At first, we consider the size of the secret parameters ∆1 and
q to prevent breaking the cryptosystem by factoring ∆q. On the other hand, an
attacker may somehow compute the image φ(a) in the maximal order O∆1 for some
ideal a of O∆q . We prove that to compute the map φ(a) is as intractable as factoring
∆q. In our cryptosystem, we make public an ideal p in Ker(ϕq). We discuss that
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according to current knowledge the knowledge of such an ideal does not bring any
advantage for factoring the discriminant. Finally we argue that a chosen ciphertext
attack as presented in [GGOQ98] against Shamir’s RSA variant [Sha95] will not give
us substantially more knowledge than previously known.
2.4.1 The size of the secret parameters ∆1, q
We discuss the size of the secret parameters ∆1 = −p and q which prevents attacks by
the known factoring algorithms. Let LN [s, c] = exp((c+o(1)) log
s(N) log log1−s(N)).
The number field sieve [LL91] and the elliptic curve method [Len87] are the different
types of factoring algorithms which have to be taken care of; other factoring algo-
rithms are more or less slower [MvOV97] [RS97] [Si00]. The number field sieve is the
fastest factoring algorithm, and the running time depends on the total bit length of
the composite number |∆q|; it is of the order of L|∆q |[1/3, (64/9)1/3]. Currently the
fastest implementation for the number field sieve factored a 155-digit (≈ 512-bit)
RSA modulus [RSA155]. If we choose ∆q to be larger than 1024 bits, the number
field sieve becomes infeasible. On the other side, the elliptic curve method depends
on the size of the primes p or q and the expected running time is Lr[1/2, 2
1/2], where
r is p or q. The fastest implementation for the elliptic curve method found a 53-digit
(≈ 175-bit) prime factor [ECM98]. If we choose p and q to be larger than 341 bits,
the elliptic curve method becomes infeasible. Therefore the 1024 bit discriminant
∆q with 341 bit p, q is secure for cryptographic purposes.
We wonder if there exists a special algorithm for factoring a composite number with
squared a prime factor. To our knowledge, the only one algorithm is presented for
this problem by Peralta-Okamoto [PO96]. They improve the elliptic curve method
by a constant factor by considering the distribution of the Jacobi symbol. For
examples, for finding the 40-digit (≈ 133-bit) prime factor, the algorithm is 25-time
faster than the original elliptic curve method. Its improvement is negligible and is
not a real threat.
2.4.2 Security of φ
Only the one who knows the conductor q can compute the map ϕq and then recover
any message ideal. The map ϕq consists of ϕq = Red∆1 ◦ φ. If attackers somehow
can compute the ideal φ(a) in the maximal order which is the image of an ideal a
in Cl(∆q), then the message ideal m may be recovered. Here, we can prove that
the discriminant ∆q can be factored using few iterations of any algorithm which
computes the image of φ.
2.1. Theorem Assume that there exists an algorithm ALφ which computes for the
primitive ideal a = (a1, a2) ∈ I∆q(q) a primitive ideal A = (A1, A2) ∈ I∆1(q) such
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that A = φ(a) without knowing the conductor q. By using the algorithm ALφ as an
oracle, the discriminant ∆q = ∆q
2 can be factored in random polynomial time.
Proof: Let a = (a, b) the a primitive ideal in I∆q(q). By using the algorithm ALφ,
we can compute A = (A,B) such that A = φ(a). The relation between the ideals a
and A is as follows:
a = A, B ≡ bq−1 (mod a). (2.4)
Therefore, we can compute q ≡ bB−1 (mod a) because (B, a) = (b, a) = 1. We
apply this algorithm for several prime ideals pi = (pi, bpi), where pi is prime with
(pi/∆q) = 1 which require the random polynomial time in generating them. After
polynomially many iterations in log2 ∆q, we can recover the conductor q using the
Chinese Remainder Theorem. It is easy to check the right q by computing the
greatest common divisor with ∆q.
This theorem means that nobody can “switch” the primitive ideal (a, b) to the
maximal order without the knowledge of the conductor q.
2.4.3 Knowledge of p
Let p be the public key which is the element in Ker(ϕq). We will argue that the
knowledge of p does not substantially help to factor ∆q using currently known fast
algorithms. For simplicity, we assume p is the generator of the group Ker(ϕq), so
the order of p is q − (q/∆1). A non-trivial ambiguous ideal is an ideal f in Cl(∆q)
such that f2 ∼ 1 and f 6∼ 1. If a non-trivial ambiguous ideal in the order O∆q is
known, we can factor the discriminant ∆q [Sch83]. For the discriminant ∆q of our
cryptosystem, there is only 1 non trivial ambiguous ideals in Cl(∆q). Moreover, the
non trivial ambiguous ideal lies in the group Ker(ϕq), so the probability that p
r for
a random r will be a non trivial ambiguous ideal is negligible. It is unknown that
other ideals in Ker(ϕq) except the ambiguous ideals can be used for factoring the
discriminant ∆q.
In our cryptosystem, we publish the ideal p. A possible attack to find a non-trivial
ambiguous ideal for a given p is to compute the order of p in the group Cl(∆q). The
fastest algorithm to compute the order of p in the group Cl(∆q) is Hafner-McCurley
algorithm [HM89]. Its running time is L|∆q |[1/2, 2
1/2] which is much slower than
factoring ∆q. This shows that with the currently known algorithms, the knowledge
of p does with high probability not help in factoring ∆q. The same reasoning applies
for polynomially many elements of Ker(ϕq).
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2.4.4 Chosen ciphertext attack
Let G1, G2 be finite abelian groups and consider a surjective homomorphism ϕ :
G1 → G2. If two elements g, h in G1 satisfy ϕ(g) = ϕ(h), then we call them to be in
the same coset. Our cryptosystem is constructed using the surjective homomorphism
ϕq : Cl(∆q)→ Cl(∆1). The message ideal m is encrypted by c = Red∆q(mpr). Then
the ciphertext c “represents” all elements of the coset of m in the group Cl(∆q).
Similarly, Shamir proposed an RSA type public key cryptosystem using the homo-
morphism ϕS : (ZZ/nZZ)
∗ → (ZZ/pZZ)∗, where n = pq and p, q are primes [Sha95]. In
the key generation, e, d are generated by the relation ed ≡ 1 (mod p − 1). The
message M must be smaller than p. For the encryption we compute C ≡ M e
(mod n), and the message can be recovered by M ≡ Cd (mod p). For an ele-
ment a ∈ (ZZ/nZZ)∗, all elements of the coset of a for the map ϕS are represented
by {a, a+ p, a+ 2p, . . . , a+ (q − 1)p}. Therefore, if we know two elements a1, a2 in
the same coset, we can factor the modulus n by computing GCD(a1 − a2, n) = p.
This is equivalent to the fact that n can be factored if we know an element in the
kernel of ϕS. Using this Gilbert et al. proposed the following attack against this
cryptosystem [GGOQ98]. Let M ′ be a message larger than p, and C be the cipher-
text corresponding to M ′. If an attacker can know the plaintext corresponding to
C, say M , then the modulus n can be factored by computing GCD(M −M ′, n). We
call this attack the chosen ciphertext attack. 1 Note that this chosen ciphertext can
be achieved because ZZ/nZZ is not only a group but also a ring.
Consider the chosen ciphertext attack against our proposed cryptosystem. Let m′
be a message ideal such that N(m′) >
√
|∆1|/3. If m is the regular message ideal
which is a reduced ideal with norm smaller than
√
|∆1|/4 and in the same coset of
m′, then we have m ∼ m′ps for some integer s ≥ 0. This yields the knowledge of
some other p′ ∈ Ker(ϕq). As shown above, no algorithm is known to compute the
factorization of ∆q when polynomially many elements of the kernel are known.
Next, we discuss the case where the chosen ciphertext attack is applied several
times. Jaulmes and Joux proposed the chosen-message attack for known two pair of
messages [JJ99]. We explain the attack in the following. It is known that if the norm
of the primitive ideal A = (A,B) ∈ Cl(∆1) is smaller than
√
|∆1| then A is already
a reduced ideal or ideal (C,R) where C = (B2−∆1)/4A and −B = 2CQ+R,−C <
R ≤ C is a reduced ideal (See, [Coh93], p.239). The ideal (C,R) is obtained after
exactly one reduction step. Here we choose two ideals a1 = (a1, b1), a2 = (a2, b2) such
that
√
|∆1|/3 < N(a1), N(a2) <
√
|∆1|, and we encrypt them by c1 ∼ a1pr1 , c2 ∼
a2p
r2 for some integers r1, r2. We assume that an attacker know the regular message
ideals of c1, c2 which are different from a1, a2. We can choose such ideals because
the bit length of b
√
|∆1|/4c is public. Here, let φ(a1) = A1 = (A1, B1), φ(a2) =
1Okamoto and Uchiyama proposed the public-key cryptosystem using the homomorphism ϕOU :
(ZZ/nZZ)∗ → (ZZ/pZZ)+, where n = p2q and p, q are primes [OU98]. This chosen ciphertext attack
is also applicable against the Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem.
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A2 = (A2, B2), then A1 = a1, A2 = a2 hold and B1, B2 are unknown. From the
above lemma the ideals A1,A2 will be reduced in exact one reduction step. Denote
by B1,B2 the reduced ideals in Cl(∆1) which are equivalent to A1,A2, respectively.
Then we have relations B1 = ((B
2
1 −∆1)/4, R1),B2 = ((B22 −∆1)/4, R2) for some
integer R1, R2. The ideal B1,B2 coincide with the regular message ideals of c1, c2,
respectively. Therefore we know the relation E1 = (B
2
1 −∆1)/4, E2 = (B22 −∆1)4,
where B1, B2,∆1 are unknown. Then we transform them (B2 + B1)(B2 − B1) =
4(E2 − E1). We can find B1, B2 by factoring 4(E2 − E1) which can be found easily
because 4|E2 − E1| < 8|∆1| holds and we can try the different pairs in case that it
is the product of two large primes. Consequently, we can find ∆1.
2.5 Running time of NICE cryptosystem
The prominent property of the proposed cryptosystem is the running time of the
decryption. Most prominent cryptosystems require decryption time O((log2 n)
3),
where n is the size of the public key. The total running time of the decryption process
of our cryptosystem is O((log2 ∆q)
2) bit operations. In order to demonstrate the
improved efficiency of our decryption, we implemented our scheme using the LiDIA
library [LiD95]. It should be emphasized here that our implementation was not
optimized for cryptographic purposes — it is only intended to provide a comparison
between decrypting in the non-maximal order and using our trapdoor decryption.
The results are shown in table 2.1.
Observe that we separated the fast exponentiation step of the encryption as a “pre-
computation” stage. Indeed, if we can securely store the values pr, then the actual
encryption can be effected very rapidly, since it requires only one ideal multiplication
and one ideal reduction. Of course, one can use one of the well-known fixed-base
exponentiation techniques completely analogously as for ElGamal type protocols as
mentioned e.g. in [MvOV97], section 14.6.3.
It should be mentioned that the size of a message for our cryptosystem is smaller
than the size of a message for the RSA encryption (e.g. 256 bit vs. 768 bit, or
341 bit vs. 1024 bit). In connection with the very fast decryption time, an excellent
purpose for our cryptosystem could be (symmetric) key distribution. In that setting,
the short message length is not a real drawback. On the other side, the message
length is longer than for ElGamal encryption on “comparably” secure elliptic curves
(e.g. 341 bit vs. 180 bit).
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log2(n) 1024 1536 2048
RSA encryption 10 ms 19 ms 31 ms
RSA classical decryption 1032 ms 3045 ms 7006 ms
NICE precomputation for p ≈ n1/3 7650 ms 21682 ms 36166 ms
NICE encryption for p ≈ n1/3 4 ms 8 ms 12 ms
NICE decryption for p ≈ n1/3 13 ms 22 ms 30 ms
NICE precomputation for p ≈ n1/4 8766 ms 24673 ms 36276 ms
NICE encryption for p ≈ n1/4 4 ms 6 ms 10 ms
NICE decryption for p ≈ n1/4 12 ms 22 ms 32 ms
Table 2.1: Average timings for the new cryptosystem compared to RSA (e = 216 +1)
over 100 randomly chosen pairs of primes of the specified size on a SPARC station
4 (110 MHz) using the LiDIA library
2.6 A smart card implementation and its prob-
lems
We implemented the NICE decryption on a smart card. More precisely, we im-
plemented the NICE decryption algorithm using the Siemens development kit for
chip card controller ICs based on Keil PK51 for Windows. As assembler we used
A51, as linker L51 to generate code for the 8051 microcontroller family. The soft-
ware simulation were made using dScope-51 for Windows and the drivers for SLE
66CX80S. Thus, we realized a software emulation of an assembler implementation
of the NICE decryption algorithm to be run on the existing Siemens SLE 66CX80S.
Unfortunately, the timings of this software simulation were unrealistic. So, we did
run some timings on a hardware simulator for SLE 66CX80S. Thanks to Deutsche
Telekom AG, Produktzentrum Telesec in Siegen and Infineon/Siemens in Munich
for letting us use their hardware simulator. See the timings for decryption in table
2.2 for a smart card running at 4.915 MHz.
log2(n) 1024
RSA decryption with CRT 490 ms
New CS decryption for p ≈ q ≈ ∆1/3q 1242 ms
Improved version 1035 ms
Table 2.2: Timings for the decryption of the new cryptosystem compared to RSA
using the hardware simulator of Siemens 66CX80S at 4.915 MHz
The very first implementation was very inefficient; the straightforward algorithms
used in the software comparison proved to be much slower on the smart card than
the existing RSA on the card. This was surprising, but after a while this could
be easily explained: the cryptographic coprocessor has been optimized for modular
exponentiation. On the other side, NICE uses mostly divisions with remainder and
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comparisons. These operations are slow on the coprocessor, so we had to modify
the decryption algorithm to speed it up in hardware. We change two parts of the
decryption aglorithm, namely step 3 and step 5 of GoToMaxOrder.
In step 3 of GoToMaxOrder, the computation of the inverse of a modulo q using
the extended Euclidean algorithm took (with q ≈ p ≈ 341 bit) about 9 seconds
(!), whereas computing the inverse using Fermat’s little theorem - by using fast
exponentiation mod q - took less than 1 second. Note that the decryption time
using this method is no longer of quadratic complexity.
The detail of the reduction algorithm in step 5 of GoToMaxOrder is as follows:
3. Algorithm (Reduction)
Input: A discriminant ∆1 and a primitive ideal A = (A,B) ⊂ O∆1
Output: A reduced ideal Red∆1(A,B)
5. /* Compute Red∆1(A,B) */
5.1. C ← (∆1 −B2)/4A
5.2. WHILE {−A < B ≤ A < C} or {0 ≤ B ≤ A = C} DO
5.2.1. Find λ, µ ∈ ZZ s.t. −A ≤ µ = B + 2λA < A using division with
remainder
5.2.2. (A,B,C)← (C − λB+µ
2
, µ, A)
5.3. IF A = C AND B < 0 THEN B ← −B
5.4. RETURN (A,B)
In the reduction process the quotient in the division with remainder step is most of
the time very small (say ≤ 10, see Appendix 2.6); to effect a division is this case is
much more time consuming than subsequent subtractions. We did replace
5.2.1 Find λ, µ ∈ ZZ s.t. −A ≤ µ = B + 2λA < A using division with remainder
5.2.2 (A,B,C)← (C − λB+µ
2
,−µ,A)
by
5.2.1 WHILE B ≤ −A OR B > A DO
5.2.1.1 IF B < 0 THEN B ← B + 2A; C ← C − (B + A)
5.2.1.2 ELSE B ← B − 2A; C ← C − (B − A);
every time that the bitlength of B was exceeding the bitlength of B by at least 3.
Using this improvement, we could decrease the running time from about 1.8 s to 1.2
s. This is already faster than a 1024 bit RSA decryption without Chinese remainder
(approx. 1.6 ms).
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The timings in table 2.2 were made including these two improvements. Moreover, a
detailed timing analysis in Siegen showed that both our static memory management
and as well as the cryptographic coprocessor are not optimal for this algorithm. We
discuss this in the sequel. An average overview of the most time consuming parts is
given in table 2.3.
Function Average time
mul, multiplications on the coprocessor 170 ms
div, divisions on the coprocessor 231 ms
left adjust, length correction of the variables 376 ms
C2XL, moving numbers into the coprocessor 118 ms
XL2C, moving numbers out of the coprocessor 223 ms
others (comparisons, small operations) 114 ms
Overall time 1242 ms
Table 2.3: Detailed timings for different functions in the decryption of the new
cryptosystem
One major difference between RSA and NICE is the number of variables needed
during the computation of the decryption algorithm. In our implementation, we need
to store 11 variables of length at most 2048 bit. Computations of the cryptographic
coprocessor are shortening these variables. Thus, we had to adjust the length of the
variables after each important operation. This was done by moving the top nonzero
bytes of the number to the fixed address of the number and so ”erasing” leading zero
bytes. To do this, we used the cryptographic coprocessor. Now the exact timings
showed that about 33 % of the running time is spent by the function left adjust,
which effects this correction.
Now changing the memory management from static to dynamic (i.e. in the XL2C
and C2XL functions making the appropriate changes and having additionally some
registers holding the starting address of the numbers), we got an improvement to
637 ms using the software simulator. Both Infineon/Siemens and Deutsche Telekom
reported the overall time of the hardware simulator now to be 1035 ms. Note that
the amount of memory required is 965 Bytes and thus fits into a real SLE 66CX80S.
As one can see from table 2.3, another important time consuming operation is to
move numbers into and out of the coprocessor. At this point, we would get a speedup
of about 350 ms if we could leave the numbers in registers inside the coprocessor. It
is clear that the currently used processor is not prepared for such operations, since
it is optimized for RSA, thus operations with very few variables. At this point we
ask the hardware community to present solutions to this problem.
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Appendix A: An example of the reduction step
Input: discriminant ∆1, an ideal A = (A,B) before the reduction step
D1 = -3919553298811157368475523990994777486712879620160636686074980926686635774565281654416535613225312452663
A = 1470919698723621747031034479033655458221345099558043935477761485226131553543707299391756504474531255189264719094757
659808191301659419506155735441417414491
B = -1612078661117333293617543382531888102723531401772217996101303796600583164587338163291108859457317212840954820324227
661206969587778502329803762655721150213
Reduction step 5.1.: quotient λ, remainder µ such that B = 2Aλ+µ, (−a ≤ µ < a)
(quotient, remainder) =
(-1, 132976073632991020044452557553542281371915879734386987485421917385167994250007643549240414949174529753757461786528
7658409413015540336682507708227113678769)
(-2, -127612435903271747284203940962563047288319779794024205168731345688046856992818597251036644668758126413199147109490
159283556463934886789503896413069632105)
(5, -785282900112624573884568439413292485034544440747434937937831117600068351530406923212045847152018597171039409030826
1868661757907073551937411599271404065)
(3, 102448189335108917873708106129511177370194888095368169144208661124365741713523215381199419560853590747848324434047
4403297520916097275928966085178754669)
(-2, -102241298455901475013823651184942662520218930922446297120610589090686808521973876143868942269542228647930772313523
574165905118338106550708986943292605)
(5, -111052964327862543248014454108681029972621611840532971461250154942477651873609548116068054690931838077804710928090
93473562855601861999949481990650315)
(2, 224721768750757491766093041444587045099908536747902569504729305667589920231890466102920134589953378731011273003071
265369685205138129287433281611151)
(-24, -193997682622386160747509256203459457001302400743643940157769391868127988127520988615996593055854386819648159017406
4685369029295289498715467235503)
(5, -872140247558161527297502021585254450313036153689333922978271792128743615045351839413078660868168505225167354418491
91048830504132818556443763927)
(5, -658925615422042834876348480484029082058507054052681386209011509962105060677563908394232616059830404811010727301359
3512069684208466784180774933)
(3, -353725409650362059341413405754405045233330716598185927166581938071831594678230116338852933339930067189465564000769
287233896579646995020989815)
(7, -247222284294593727142489621540238650242932541449160633234337068881461071113337993384784406154327323546383475378203
76474826892936909497877111)
(2, 211238960823671342461903216289647740521689040736096428971091833115479874530277048960194279957267650917082000952992
7566081981468920686945135)
(-5, -138828499610837630682998254650680087729785399344104356860281267036927461979957572311938410081908330045415812611779
611796816538719307405505)
(3, -765811450988547423144046883303894668462310641251449515590759557414197782566477229459016888940284991233814769828608
3138580548663993732859)
(6, 451715975973337636239923655622704513018369560900086413869204962835152615559671858853242965579677357251079839392053
844630453417984392931)
(-3, 579493992911536599517350321866083438435686742562973463372479826459392480226779856939226160460117478967847924671753
92968596489710481213)
(-3, 135067752525885105483994559664721938559177175680541689433450130455304919692737374065720006258404545809371465593318
9049738778828983289)
(-15, 337193319312295431745969016664643151387915479765592068235657385273215560443110982269888116148705401309431343138225
96913769977980851)
(-3, 323878473831343845968960745512074363754506782760808676681774080723182382322942699332100336805150642284551592326904
4296100266373941)
(-4, 167144197381464431967528225738718542314051660172099527690831373123590316239808571782330789831021939891807455958096
732542876200243)
(-5, -309390011597559593159761073745581970668200194635499292322116436596067679796830203942404937063400931822640702431265
3906939082883)
(11, -115310685805821673604505436475263765545172934158683202462769686123589664701441798228728715241781657550421817808920
121862424193)
(3, -214164778849294341813886319240237413612645988098168730763311338303186025963320880697339330474638842906957278383121
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(2, 128885235911603341061379124399416424159190535507373563424716539280561837794601490501570150868125552599247818531014
6905542061)
(-8, 316335781594392130649537991526978632041159226767264341022335809622254943347009615572076976512856499763471626857986
37456771)
(-5, -132100188970518808134989273741019953395958169925083468958496091548029282207578810138129189350877886346393515471619
9449891)
(5, -118207678855173060273461976677047511666107495356238233325850746777448433952887041962223444468735121774461329878842
257829)
(2, 211192794617132775962070178935022665383131433119630308575044151078117101318282538223456317584240935159085658194389
75697)
(-2, -274328530511417242554111054080256110572002014193891842660039774575578405921937962321580147605536058202955477454722
6713)
(3, 286074815889198540147442971313659278227472798937810428709777362705663473916998086767681817465542781829132249359517
975)
(-3, 136753299791205246544364486899154151347754882077985198546727042251978367689138220757139643994263442612011028174033
09)
(-7, -573392565819784089015761647765609265475213202129944067089638531361517839793128894759675411629999386769288097157573)
(3, 46420141247202899632758735492428308491655665018737859648769488246653936727190431310329578844089903814145126014811)
(-4, 2648752977947845396817832353867014934646503864836612394943244361752704526516616394918528493321394574264607485573)
(-5, 210855924586385522702291996875375564432834909148788263313616464995823236571191045770185801157558886696640500937)
(-3, 22358943854775137747028532971526452088757418214703795026514539955938354527714495940754319443379591091154854811)
(-3, -3066428918730050632325097660734163737851572230223614656315369265785635066318979992409078183621174963776878039)
(2, 142086598987407275566528223029847683110629990793367193207487961621845231249474450762716878333452768170371307)
(-10, -4013833186275051054261529002448266001854462865736283000730209262386311300176819714480584897953649188768987)
(3, 513318782779814540099933414852657264974713493469374585453379543647835185456621560862523908562876553217709)
(-2, -61677436882563203815369113178313444194666063177138061203361907960930109397743003273918060562207208817421)
(4, -5705343812063530411004779368065864956629980006638652578479437486915684727604688458627505624819542303243)
(3, -91558187817393163469667420478915357008167385723230297957370355268833319053370140794607127532476127053)
(21, 453868533685069718784249965367088878135788567086616180536047830052899711042568402989974727201843537)
(-10, 20964009631208954520918551253653792022251672637669648478775352234648622483831508661058580485766883)
(-2, -2452654164796263512959165565377597147123165793392501354290866811059027722610119847271723828796771)
(4, -147052793673461538086506530668357561094222647824631587108653738299104036416816746499164729738165)
(4, 13963798812911120130279709463801187300299288356253613055092055278693493066888731286397000735637)
(-2, -2243059469029860341733582498093820347780557194768743665298129222007849423064256685446565258585)
(3, -332536984737070293356781633953414109182889100380596552532026039092003149663826893067835527979)
(3, -53869672449708954071201037343980172216194792353383517263934399693845855469016876949250112145)
(2, 8809243662589899724441862302427489374063110417101583652380728682887905485821254651162082773)
(-3, 1523916850396224929683411116520822483473365693967880645688939842558533917993725763450387843)
(-2, -175448936439219351474943190408140984880152096488165074286001873576813341763276791632528051)
(4, -7172119525392604758586912757900411673673727956088230007355764602327785267343320520772285)
(6, 411983586217791325733798025629672849513780286785778486048473044819412478399711749331293)
(-3, 39952378254046331640985245359853148480439674672046852693477940886873371190791503779555)
(-4, 2430418964222694480671212916136321892771426164807894584775183594905868264571397226917)
(-4, -200481638950679212651370696237549969836787003530772668084652658004782296755431254661)
(3, -15809036670606058719969662268090458772980604046280756287155668401840558844802721257)
(5, -1523585718315717333817603063481778938222355282742962613553158680390832265726743003)
(2, 184311493695616947777956105808291545959771200085283101706038290472860989663874931)
(-4, 18608721351129642487382805128934749545584400507726296787447608402705855634753005)
(-3, 1869347445173273085208023229014781878050128548111311960144791632389450110085991)
(-4, 178380730096884354033504909171901616894208529518268605707305999380528892537777)
(-3, 8087485289366444463103610663066672869280303202819888635266439607722241722651)
(-8, 330989870518604330321501498261660421116420485572033339979389384876143961861)
(-3, -18664536615969020483601618613669413560772978432066084296155744931355960393)
(6, -1412504875497260093376398626643530047287435788085760178403662982434702419)
(2, 219996492734844884145785372293460505348942755871479135939553072964463795)
(-3, 23516043605665539210119254241067982862993090461007215280854551535870327)
(-3, -3077511624656829785194435187496372328800530833832937512976380187853603)
(2, 297152112917428186473487402530178004938361047882953462356887529974435)
(-5, 20430479687841138388651786490336214660319513581933064107387538439725)
(-3, -715710522544461579764349638671583037687849172262961920648424641623)
(9, 14179513470875975149484884956525606261632898759917041924304692531)
(-5, -1282525333271264792977028780361879602218745339300046465268399291)
(2, 7133580613529858737331990335086812687125553016512866750439935)
(-89, -31402743133518053709238680774128360213498381554795257802491)
(3, -5670014347280097827799124543796297689457759679846318408801)
(2, 466884359172087417048784300784530655902510368684415610549)
(-6, 35846124997992718851920200094845005686531518229928579835)
(-2, -5174946979118686463949165359305774723028412521870150151)
(3, -63863243252949591186892355477373614132946424509565125)
(27, 742593578199047322036735798245427373773251928151497)
(0, -742593578199047322036735798245427373773251928151497)
Output: the reduced ideal (A1, B1) equivalent to A
A1 = 956239841432722652133553576334329186177525820778149
B1 = -742593578199047322036735798245427373773251928151497
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Chapter 3
PkQ cryptosystem
We propose a cryptosystem modulo pkq based on the RSA cryptosystem. We choose
an appropriate modulus pkq which resists two of the fastest factoring algorithms,
namely the number field sieve and the elliptic curve method. We also apply the
fast decryption algorithm modulo pk proposed in [Tak97]. The decryption process
of the proposed cryptosystems is faster than the RSA cryptosystem using Chinese
remainder theorem, known as the Quisquater-Couvreur method [QC82]. For ex-
ample, if we choose the 1024-bit modulus p2q for 341-bit primes p and q, then the
decryption process of the proposed cryptosystem is about 3 times faster than that
of RSA cryptosystem using Quisquater-Couvreur method.
3.1 Introduction
The RSA cryptosystem is one of the most practical public key cryptosystems and
is used throughout the world [RSA78]. Let n be a public key, which is the product
of two appropriate primes, e be an encryption key, and d be a decryption key.
The algorithms of encryption and decryption consist of exponentiation to the eth
and dth powers modulo n, respectively. We can make e small, but must consider
low exponent attacks [CFPR96] [Cop96] [Ha88]. The encryption process takes less
computation and is fast. On the other hand, the decryption key d must have more
than one fourth the number of bits of the public key n to preclude Wiener’s attack
[Wie90] and its extension [VT97]. Therefore, the cost of the decryption process is
dominant for the RSA cryptosystem.
In this chapter, we propose an RSA-type cryptosystem modulo n = pkq. Even
though the modulus is not of the form pq, we choose appropriate sizes for the secret
primes p and q to preclude both the number field sieve and the elliptic curve method.
Using this modulus pkq, we construct a fast decryption public-key cryptosystem. In
the key generation, we generate the public key e and secret key d using the relation
ed ≡ 1 (mod L), where L = LCM(p − 1, q − 1). Note that L is not the same as
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φ(n) = pk−1(p− 1)(q− 1) or even λ(n) = LCM(pk−1(p− 1), q− 1). Thus, the secret
exponent d becomes much smaller than n = pkq. Moreover, for decrypting Mp ≡ M
(mod pk) we show that it is possible to apply the fast decryption algorithm proposed
in [Tak97]. The running time for computing Mp is essentially equivalent to that for
Cd (mod p). Therefore, the decryption process is much faster than in the RSA
cryptosystem using the Chinese remainder theorem [QC82].
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the algorithm of the
proposed cryptosystem. We discuss the size of the secret primes which prevents the
use of both the number field sieve and the elliptic curve method in Section 3. Then,
we show the running time of the proposed cryptosystem in comparison with the
RSA cryptosystem using the Quisquater-Couvreur method in Section 4. We explain
the effectiveness of Wiener’s attack in Section 5. We show some properties of our
cryptosystem related to some attacks in Section 6.
Notation: Z is an integer ring. Zn is a residue ring Z/nZ and its complete residue
class is {0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1}. Z×n is a reduced residue group modulo n. LCM(m1,m2)
is the least common multiple of m1 and m2. GCD(m1,m2) is the greatest common
divisor of m1 and m2.
3.2 PkQ cryptosystem
In this section, we describe an RSA-type cryptosystem modulo pkq, and discuss the
size of its secret keys and the running time.
3.2.1 Algorithm
1. Generation of the keys: Generate two random primes p, q, and let n = pkq.
Compute L = LCM (p−1, q−1), and find e, d which satisfies ed ≡ 1 (mod L)
and GCD(e, p) = 1. Then e, n are public keys, and d, p, q are the secret keys.
2. Encryption: Let M ∈ Z×n be the plaintext. We encrypt the plaintext by the
equation:
C ≡M e (mod n). (3.1)
3. Decryption: We decrypt Mp ≡ M (mod pk) and Mq ≡ M (mod q) using the
secret key d, p, q. The plaintext M can be recovered by the Chinese remainder
theorem. Here, Mq is computed by Mq ≡ Cd (mod q) and Mp is computed by
the fast algorithm described in [Tak97].
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3.2.2 Details of the decryption algorithm
The order of the group Z×pk is p
k−1(p − 1). When Mp ≡ M (mod pk) is recovered
using the standard algorithm of RSA, we have to compute Mp ≡ Cd (mod pk) for
d ≡ e−1 (mod LCM(pk−1(p− 1), q− 1)). Then the running time is slower than that
of the method using the Chinese remainder theorem for n = pq [QC82], so there are
no significant advantages in using the modulus pkq. Instead, we apply the method
described in [Tak97], where the author presents a fast algorithm for computing
RSA decryption modulo nk using n-adic expansion. Then, the running time for
computing Mp becomes essentially equivalent to computing Mp ≡ Cd (mod p) for
d ≡ e−1 (mod LCM(p− 1, q − 1)).
First, we modify the algorithm into a more efficient form. We denote the ciphertext
reduced modulo pk by Cp. Then the relationship between the ciphertext Cp and the
plaintext is Cp ≡ M ep (mod pk). Note that Mp the plaintext modulo pk, has the
p-adic expansion such that
Mp ≡ K0 + pK1 + p2K2 + . . .+ pk−1Kk−1 (mod pk). (3.2)
Here, we define the function Fi(X0, X1, . . . , Xi) as follows:
Fi(X0, X1, . . . , Xi) = (X0 + pX1 + . . .+ p
iXi)
e,
where i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. Fk−1(X0 + pX1 + . . . + pk−1Xk−1)e is the same as the
function that encrypts the plaintext Mp in equation (3.2). By reducing modulo
pi+1, we get the relationship
Fi(X0, X1, . . . , Xi) ≡ Fi−1 + piGi−1Xi (mod pi+1),
where Fi−1 = Fi−1(X0 + pX1 + . . . + pi−1Xi−1)e and Gi−1 = e(X0 + pX1 + . . . +
pi−1Xi−1)e−1 for i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. From this relationship, we can recursively
calculate K1, . . . , Kk−1. For i = 1, K1 is the solution of the following linear equation
of X1:
C ≡ F0(K0) + pG0(K0)X1 (mod p2). (3.3)
Assume we have already calculated K1, K2, . . . , Ki−1. Using these values, we com-
pute Fi−1(K0, K1, . . . , Ki−1), Gi−1(K0, K1, . . . , Ki−1) in Z, and denote them by Fi−1, Gi−1,
respectively. Then, Ki is the solution of the following linear equation of Xi:
C ≡ Fi−1 + piGi−1Xi (mod pi+1). (3.4)
Note that (Gi−1, p) = 1, because GCD(K0, p) = GCD(e, p) = 1, so we can uniquely
decrypt Ki.
After computing K0, K1, . . . , Kk−1, we can evaluate Mp (mod pk) from equation
(3.2). Finally, the plaintext M (mod pkq) is also computed from the values Mp
(mod pk),Mq (mod q), and the Chinese remainder theorem.
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Moreover, note that we do not have to use the secret exponent d for evaluating
K1, K2, . . . , Kk−1. Thus, when we compute the two values of K0 ≡ Cd (mod p) and
Mq ≡ Cd (mod q), the secret exponent d can be reduced modulo p − 1 and q − 1.
Indeed, Cd ≡ Cdp (mod p) and Cd ≡ Cdq (mod q) hold, where dp ≡ d (mod p− 1)
and dq ≡ d (mod q − 1).
In Appendix A, we describe the decryption program written in pseudo-code. For
x ∈ Z and a positive integer N , [x]N denotes the remainder of x modulo N , which
is in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}.
3.3 Size of secret parameters
Here, we discuss the size of the secret parameters p and q. The RSA cryptosystem
uses a composite number of the symmetry type pq, where p and q are the same bit
size. The cryptosystem proposed in this chapter depends on the security of factoring
the modulus pkq. We have to carefully choose the size of p and q.
There are two types of fast factoring algorithm to consider: the number field
sieve [LL91] and the elliptic curve method [Len87]. Other factoring algorithms
have the same or slower running times, so the size of the RSA-modulus can be
estimated by these two factoring algorithms [KR95] [MvOV97] [RS97] [Si00]. Let
LN [s, c] = exp((c+o(1)) log
s(N) log log1−s(N)). The number field sieve is the fastest
factoring algorithm, and the running time is estimated from the total bit size of the
integer n to be factored, which is expected as Ln[1/3, (64/9)
1/3]. If we choose n to
be larger than 1024 bits, the number field sieve becomes infeasible. In our case, we
have to make the modulus n = pkq larger than 1024 bits. The elliptic curve method
is effective for finding primes which are divisors of the integer n to be factored. The
running time is estimated in terms of the bit size of the prime divisor p. Its expected
value is Lp[1/2, 2
1/2]. Note that the running time of the elliptic curve method is
different from that of the number field sieve, and the order is much different. If we
choose p to be larger than 341 bits, the elliptic curve method becomes infeasible. In
our case, we have to make the primes p and q of the modulus larger than 341 bits.
The factoring algorithm strongly depends on the implementation. In my knowledge,
the fastest implementation record for the number field sieves factored a 155-digit
(≈ 512-bit) RSA modulus [RSA155] and that for the elliptic curve method found
a 53-digit (≈ 175-bit) prime factor [ECM98]. Here, we again emphasize that there
is a big difference in the cost between the number field sieve and the elliptic curve
method. Therefore, if we choose the 1024-bit modulus p2q with 341-bit primes p
and q, neither of the factoring algorithms is feasible, so the scheme is secure for
cryptographic purposes. But the size of secret primes must be thoroughly discussed
for the practical usage of our proposed cryptosystem, and this is work in progress.
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Here, we wonder if there exists factoring algorithms against the modulus with a
square factor p2q. This factoring problem appeared in the list of the open problems in
number theoretic complexity by Adleman and McCurley [AM94], and it is unknown
whether there exists Lp[1/3]-type sub-exponential algorithm which finds the primes
of the composite number p2q. Recently, Peralta and Okamoto proposed a factoring
algorithm against numbers of the form p2q based on the elliptic curve method [PO96].
They focused on the fact the Jacobi symbol is equal to one for a square integer, and
the running time becomes a little bit faster than that of the original elliptic curve
method.
A digital signature scheme [Oka90] and two public key cryptosystems [HJPT98]
[OU98] which rely on the difficulty of factoring numbers of the type p2q have been
proposed. These cryptosystems are fast and practical. For secure usage of these
cryptosystems and our proposed cryptosystem, the research of factoring algorithms
against a composite number with a square factor is desirable.
3.4 Running time of PkQ cryptosystem
In this section, we estimate the running time of the proposed cryptosystem. We
assume that the public modulus n = p2q is 1024 bits for 341-bit primes p and q
in the following. We also assume the running time for computing Za (mod b) is
O(log22(b) log2(a)). Below, we estimate the worst-case running time.
In the decryption process of the proposed cryptosystem, the algorithm does not
depend on the secret exponent d except when we compute
Cd (mod p), Cd (mod q). (3.5)
After calculating Cd (mod p), we compute only a few multiplications for obtaining
Mp ≡ M (mod pk). This costs the same as the encryption process. If we choose a
very small e, this algorithm is very efficient. For example, if the modulus be p2q,
then we only compute at most blog2 ec multiplications modulo p2 and one division
of p, two multiplications modulo p, and one inversion modulo p. Moreover, when
we compute the two values of equation (3.5), the secret exponent d can be reduced
modulo p− 1 and q− 1. In other words, Cd ≡ Cdp (mod p) and Cd ≡ Cdq (mod q)
hold, where dp ≡ d (mod p − 1) and dq ≡ d (mod q − 1). Thus, the size of the
secret exponent can be reduced.
Denote by T the running time for computing the decryption algorithm of the original
RSA cryptosystem, i.e., Cd
′
(mod n), where d′ is as large as n. Then, the running
time of the proposed cryptosystem for a 1024-bit modulus is about (2(1/3)3+αe)T =
(0.074+αe)T , where αe depends only on the encryption exponent e. When we make
the encryption exponent e very small, αe becomes negligible.
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A similar decryption algorithm for the RSA cryptosystem using Chinese remainder
theorem, the Quisquater-Couvreur method, mainly computes Cd (mod p) and Cd
(mod q), where n = pq is the RSA modulus, both p and q are as large as (log2 n)/2
bits, and we assume d is as large as p and q. So, the running time of Quisquater-
Couvreur method is about 4 times faster than the original RSA cryptosystem.
Here, we compare the running time of our proposed cryptosystem with that of
Quisquater-Couvreur method. The comparison is carried out based on the common
bit length of the modulus. The proposed cryptosystem with the small encryp-
tion exponent e is about 3 times faster than the RSA cryptosystem applying the
Quisquater-Couvreur method for the 1024-bit modulus.
In addition, consider the RSA cryptosystem with the square-free modulus n =
p1p2 · · · pl, where we assume that pi are as large as (log2 n)/l bits for i = 1, 2, . . . , l.
As we discussed in Section 3.3, we can use a 1024-bit modulus n = p1p2p3 with
341-bit primes pi(i = 1, 2, 3) for the cryptographic purpose. This version of RSA
will be faster when we use the decryption technique using the Chinese remainder
theorem. Indeed, the decryption time with this modulus is dominant for computing
Cdi (mod pi), where we assume di are as large as pi for i = 1, 2, 3. So, the running
time of this RSA variant is about 9 times faster than the original RSA cryptosystem.
Here, we compare this RSA variant with our proposed cryptosystem. Our proposed
cryptosystem is about 1.5 times faster for a 1024-bit modulus.
3.5 Implementation data of PkQ cryptosystem
In order to demonstrate the improved efficiency of our decryption, we implemented
our scheme using the LiDIA library [LiD95]. It should be emphasized here that our
implementation was not optimized for cryptographic purposes — it is only intended
to provide a comparison between the RSA cryptosystem and the PkQ cryptosystem.
We implement two different sizes of moduli, namely a 1024-bit modulus n = p2q for
341-bit primes p, q and a 2048-bit modulus n = p3q for 512-bit primes p, q. These
moduli are secure for cryptographic purposes (see Section 3.3 or reference [Si00]).
The results are shown in table 3.1 for the 1024-bit modulus and in table 3.2 for the
2048-bit modulus.
RSA RSA with CRT PkQ cryptosystem (k = 2)
Key Generation 2,256.91 ms — 580.41 ms
Encryption 1.14 ms — 1.20 ms
Decryption 118.68 ms 36.43 ms 15.25 ms
Table 3.1: Average timings for the PkQ cryptosystem compared to RSA cryptosys-
tem for a 1024-bit modulus and e = 216 + 1 over 1000 randomly chosen pairs of
primes of the specified size on a Celeron 500 MHz using the LiDIA library
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RSA RSA with CRT PkQ cryptosystem (k = 3)
Key Generation 28,759.11 ms — 2,344.38 ms
Encryption 4.34 ms — 4.54 ms
Decryption 798.51 ms 235.23 ms 42.36 ms
Table 3.2: Average timings for the PkQ cryptosystem compared to RSA cryptosys-
tem with a 2048-bit modulus and e = 216 + 1 over 1000 randomly chosen pairs of
primes of the specified size on a Celeron 500 MHz using the LiDIA library
3.6 Short secret exponent d
A short secret exponent is desirable for the fast decryption algorithm. However,
Wiener reported an attack based on the continued fraction algorithm which detects
a short secret exponent d [Wie90]. This attack is effective for d < n1/4.
The secret key d and the public key e of the proposed cryptosystem have the relation
ed ≡ 1 (mod LCM(p − 1, q − 1)), and the primes p and q are much smaller than
n. So, we wonder if Wiener’s attack is applicable to larger secret exponents d.
Moreover, if the attacker can compute d′ such that
ed′ ≡ 1 (mod LCM(pk−1(p− 1), q − 1)), (3.6)
then proposed cryptosystem will also be broken.
Here, we discuss Wiener’s attack for relation (3.6). From LCM(pk−1(p− 1), q− 1) =
pk−1(p − 1)(q − 1)/GCD(pk−1(p − 1), q − 1), we have ed′ = 1 + mpk−1(p − 1)(q −
1)/GCD(pk−1(p− 1), q− 1) for some integer m. Generally, GCD(pk−1(p− 1), q− 1)
is very small compared with p and q. Let m/GCD(pk−1(p− 1), q − 1) = h/g, where
GCD(h, g) = 1. Then, we get the relation∣∣∣∣∣ epkq − hgd′
∣∣∣∣∣ = δ′, (3.7)
where δ′ = h
gd′
pk+pk−1q−pk−1−g/h
pkq
. From h/d′g ≤ 1, the upper bound of δ′ is of the size
n−1/(k+1). It is known that for a rational number x such that |x − P/Q| < 1/2Q2,
P/Q is a convergent in the continued fraction of x, where P and Q are relatively
prime integers. Therefore, if n−1/(k+1) < 1/2(gd′)2 holds, then Wiener’s attack is
applicable by computing the continued fraction of e/pkq. Therefore, Wiener’s attack
is effective for d′ < n
1
2(k+1) . During key generation one must ensure that d′ ≡ e−1
(mod LCM(pk−1(p− 1), (q − 1)) is sufficiently large.
In the same manner, we can discuss the Wiener’s attack for the relation ed ≡ 1
(mod LCM(p− 1, q − 1)). In this case, we get the relation∣∣∣∣∣ epkq − hgdpk−1
∣∣∣∣∣ = δ, (3.8)
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where δ = h
gd
p+q−1−g/h
pkq
. The lower bound on δ is of the size 1/gdnk/(k+1), and
1/gdnk/(k+1) is larger than the upper bound 1/2(gdpk−1)2 ∼ 1/2(gdn(k−1)/(k+1))2
which the continued fraction can detect. So, Wiener’s attack seems infeasible for
the relation ed ≡ 1 (mod LCM(p− 1, q − 1)). Further work on this is in progress.
3.7 Other properties
In this section, we describe some attacks against our proposed cryptosystem and
some other properties of it.
Permutation: Let S be a finite set, and let F (x) be a function from S to S. The
function F (x) is called a permutation function if every pair x, y ∈ S that satisfies
F (x) = F (y) also satisfies x = y. The encryption function must be a permutation
function in order to have unique decryption. The encryption function of the proposed
cryptosystem is F (X) ≡ Xe (mod pkq). This function is a permutation function if
and only if GCD(p − 1, e) = GCD(q − 1, e) = GCD(p, e) = 1. The last condition
is always satisfied for small e, so this condition becomes the same as that for the
original RSA cryptosystem.
Message concealing: A function F (x) is called unconcealed when F (x) = x holds for
some x. If the encryption function is unconcealed, some plaintexts are not encrypted.
Blakley and Borosh showed that the encryption function of the RSA cryptosystem is
unconcealed [BB79]. And they also estimated the number of unconcealed messages
for a modulus having the form pkq. They proved
N = (1 + GCD(e− 1, pk−1(p− 1)))(1 + GCD(e− 1, (q − 1))).
This number is negligible because we choose e to be small in our proposed cryp-
tosystem.
Cycling attack: The cycling attack is to find an integer s such that Ce
s ≡ C
(mod pkq) [Mau95] [WS79]. If we find such an integer, then the modulus pkq can
be factored with probability greater than 1/2. From a recent result by Rivest and
Silverman, it is known that the probability of the cycling attack success is negligible
[RS97]. This analysis is also true for our proposed cryptosystem, because p and q
must be chosen to be more than 341-bit primes. Here, denote by ordm(Q) the order
of the point Q in the group Zm for some integer m, and ordordn(C)(e)|s holds. Note
that ordm(Q)|ordn(Q) for m|n and Q in Zn. The probability that p|ordpk(Q) for a
random point Q in Zpk is 1 − 1/p, so p|ordn(C) holds for a random ciphertext C
in Zn with high probability, and ordp(e) is greater than the largest prime of p − 1,
which is more than 50 bits with high probability. Therefore, the integer s is greater
than 50 bits with high probability.
Other attacks: All other attacks are applicable, for example, the low exponent
attacks [CFPR96] [Cop96] [Ha88], the common modulus attack, and the chosen
message attack (See, for example, [KR95] [MvOV97]).
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Digital signature: Of course, the proposed algorithm can be used for a digital sig-
nature.1 The prominent property of our proposed cryptosystem is the running time
for generating the signature, which it is faster than that of the RSA cryptosystem
using Chinese remainder theorem.
Rabin-type cryptosystem: We can construct a Rabin-type cryptosystem by applying
the algorithm proposed in this chapter. We can also prove that the extended Rabin-
type cryptosystem is as intractable as factoring the modulus pkq.
3.8 Conclusion
We proposed a RSA-type cryptosystem using the modulus pkq. We choose the
modulus to be for example 1024-bit p2q for the 341-bit primes p and q, in order to
make both the elliptic curve method and the number field sieve infeasible. So, this
modulus are secure against the fast factoring algorithms. When we use this modulus,
the proposed cryptosystem is about 3 times faster than the RSA cryptosystem using
the Quisquater-Couvreur method.
Appendix A: Decryption algorithm of the PkQ cryp-
tosystem
In this appendix, we describe the decryption program written in pidgin ALGOL.
For x ∈ Z and a positive integer N , [x]N will denote the remainder of x modulo N ,
which is in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}. The plaintext M is encrypted by C ≡M e (mod pkq).
The relation between the encryption exponent e and the decryption exponent d is
ed ≡ 1 (mod LCM(p− 1, q − 1)).
procedure PkQ Decryption:
INPUT: d, p, q, e, k, C
OUTPUT: M
(1) dp := [d]p−1, dq := [d]q−1;
(2) K0 := [C
dp ]p,Mq := [C
dq ]q;
(3) A0 := K0;
FOR i = 1 to (k − 1) do
1Shamir proposed a variation of RSA cryptosystem with an unbalanced modulus [Sha95]. As
he stated in the paper, Shamir’s RSA can not be used for digital signatures.
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Fi := [Ai−1e]pi+1 ;
Ei := [C − Fi]pi+1 ;
Bi := Ei/p
i in Z;
Ki := [(eFi)
−1Ai−1Bi]p;
Ai := Ai−1 + piKi in Z;
(4) Mpk := Ak−1;
(5) p1 := [(p
k)−1]q, v1 := [(Mq −Mpk)p1]q
(6) M ≡Mpk + pkv1 mod n
Chapter 4
Nk cryptosystem
We propose two RSA-type cryptosystems using n-adic expansion, where n is the
public key. These cryptosystems can have more than one block as a plaintext space,
and the decrypting process is faster than any other multi-block RSA-type cryptosys-
tem ever reported. Deciphering the entire plaintext of this system is as intractable
as breaking the RSA cryptosystem or factoring. Even if a message is several times
longer than a public key n, we can encrypt the message fast without repeatedly
using the secret key cryptosystem.
4.1 Introduction
The RSA cryptosystem is one of the most practical public key cryptosystems and
is used throughout the world [RSA78]. Let n be a public key, which is the product
of two appropriate primes, e be an encryption key, and d be a decryption key. The
algorithms of encryption and decryption consist of the e-th and d-th power modulo
n, respectively. We can make e small by considering the low exponent attacks
[CFPR96] [Cop96] [Ha88]. The encryption process uses less computation and is
fast. On the other hand, we must keep the decryption key d up to the same size
as the public key n to preclude Wiener’s attack [Wie90]. Therefore, the cost of the
decryption process is dominant for the RSA cryptosystem.
If a cryptosystem has more than one block of plaintexts, where each block is as
large as the public-key n, we call it a multi-block cryptosystem. A lot of multi-block
RSA-type cryptosystems have been proposed [Dem94] [KMOV92] [Koy95] [LKBS92]
[MM96] [SE96]. Their advantage is that they allow us to encrypt data larger than
the public-key at a time, and we can prove their security is equivalent to the original
RSA cryptosystem or factoring. However, these algorithms are very slow and the
attacks against the RSA cryptosystem are also applicable to them (See, for example,
[Kal97] [TN96].). We cannot find significant advantage over using the original RSA
cryptosystem for each block.
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In this chapter, we propose two methods of constructing fast multi-block RSA-type
cryptosystems. We express the plaintext as an n-adic expansion, where n is the
public key. The features of this method are as follows. We can take an arbitrary
number of blocks as a plaintext. To implement the proposed cryptosystems, we use
only ordinary and elementary mathematical techniques i.e., the greatest common
divisor, so the designer can easily make them. Deciphering the entire plaintext of
the proposed cryptosystems is as hard as breaking the original RSA cryptosystem
or factoring. Moreover, the decryption speed is much faster than any previously
proposed multi-block RSA-type cryptosystems. Decryption time of the first block
is dominant, because we calculate the modular multiplication of the encryption
exponent and a greatest common divisor to decrypt blocks after the first one. Even
if a message is several times longer than a public-key n, we can encrypt the message
fast without repeatedly using the secret key cryptosystem.
Notation: Z is an integer ring. Zn is a residue ring Z/nZ and its complete residue
class is {0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1}. Z×n is a reduced residue group modulo n. LCM(m1,m2)
is the least common multiple of m1 and m2. GCD(m1,m2) is the greatest common
divisor of m1 and m2. lCm is permutation theory notation meaning the number of
ways of choosing m from l.
4.2 Nk cryptosystem
In this section, we describe how to extend the RSA cryptosystem using n-adic ex-
pansion, and discuss its security and running time.
4.2.1 Algorithm
1. Generation of the keys: Generate two appropriate primes p, q, and let n = pq.
Compute L = LCM (p−1, q−1), and find e, d which satisfies ed ≡ 1 (mod L),
GCD (e, L) = 1 and GCD (e, n) = 1. Then e, n are public keys, and d is the
secret key.
2. Encryption: Let M0 ∈ Zn× and M1, . . . ,Mk−1 ∈ Zn be the plaintext. We
encrypt the plaintexts by the equation:
C ≡ (M0 + nM1 + . . .+ nk−1Mk−1)e (mod nk). (4.1)
3. Decryption: First, we decrypt the first block M0 by the secret key d:
M0 ≡ Cd (mod n). (4.2)
This is the same decryption process as in the original RSA. For the remain-
ing blocks M1,M2, . . . ,Mk−1, we can decrypt by solving the linear equation
modulo n.
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4.2.2 Details of decryption
Assume that we have already decrypted M0 by the decryption method of the original
RSA cryptosystem, and we write down the process to find M1,M2, . . . , Mk−1 as
follows.
Consider that the encryption function (4.1) is the polynomial of the variables X0,
X1, . . . , Xk−1 such that
E(X0, X1, . . . , Xk−1) = (X0 + nX1 + . . .+ nk−1Xk−1)e.
Expand the polynomial E(X0, X1, . . . , Xk−1) by the polynomial theorem:∑
0≤s0,s1,...,sk−1≤e
s0+s1+...+sk−1=e
e!
s0!s1! . . . sk−1!
Xs00 (nX1)
s1 . . . (nk−1Xk−1)sk−1 .
And let
Γi := {(s0, s1, . . . , si) | s1 + 2s2 + . . .+ isi = i,
s0 + s1 + . . .+ si = e, 0 ≤ s0, s1, . . . , si ≤ e},
where (0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1). Let Di(X0, X1, . . . , Xi) be the coefficient of ni (0 ≤ i ≤
k − 1). For i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, we can find Di(X0, X1, . . . , Xi) by calculating
Di(X0, X1, . . . , Xi) =
∑
(s0,s1,...,si)∈Γi
e!
s0!s1! . . . si!
Xs00 X
s1
1 . . . X
si
i . (4.3)
Here, we write them down with small i as follows:
D0(X0) = M
e
0 ,
D1(X0, X1) = eM
e−1
0 M1,
D2(X0, X1, X2) = eC2M
e−2
0 M
2
1 + eM
e−1
0 M2,
D3(X0, X1, X2, X3) = eC3M
e−3
0 M
3
1 + 2eC2M
e−2
0 M1M2 + eM
e−1
0 M3,
D4(X0, X1, . . . , X4) = eC4M
e−4
0 M
4
1 + 3eC3M
e−3
0 M
2
1M2 + eC2M
e−2
0 M
2
2 + eM
e−1
0 M4,
D5(X0, X1, . . . , X5) = eC5M
e−5
0 M
5
1 + 4eC4M
e−4
0 M
3
1M2 + 3eC3M
e−3
0 M1M
2
2
+2eC2M
e−2
0 M2M3 + 2eC2M
e−2
0 M1M4 + eM
e−1
0 M5,
D6(X0, X1, . . . , X6) = eC6M
e−6
0 M
6
1 + 5eC5M
e−5
0 M
4
1M2 + 4eC4M
e−4
0 M
3
1M3
+3eC3M
e−3
0 M
2
1M4 + eC3M
e−3
0 M
3
2 + eC2M
e−2
0 M
2
3
+2eC2M
e−2
0 M2M4 + 2eC2M
e−2
0 M1M5 + eM
e−1
0 M6,
· · ·
Dk−1(X0, X1, . . . , Xk−1) = { polynomial of M0,M1, . . . ,Mk−1}.
We show the algorithm of decryption. Note that the terms that include Xi do not
appear in Dj (j < i), and the only term that includes Xi in Di is eX
e−1
0 Xi for
i = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. We define
D′i(X0, X1, . . . , Xi−1) = Di(X0, X1, . . . , Xi)− eXe−10 Xi.
36 CHAPTER 4. NK CRYPTOSYSTEM
Therefore, the termsD0, D1, . . . , Di−1, D′i are the polynomial ofX0, X1, . . . , Xi−1 (0 ≤
i ≤ k − 1).
From this relation, we can inductively decrypt Mi after decrypting M0,M1, . . . ,
Mi−1 (0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1). Indeed, M1,M2, . . . ,Mk−1 are calculated as follows. At first,
let i = 1. The relations D′1(X0) = 0 and D0(X0) = X
e
0 hold. So, the solution of the
linear equation
eM e−10 x ≡ B1 (mod n), B1 = E1/n, (4.4)
E1 ≡ C −D0(M0) (mod n2),
is M1, because M0 and e are in the reduced residue class modulo n such that Zn
×.
Provided that we decrypt M1,M2, . . . ,Mi−1, in the same manner we can uniquely
decrypt Mi by solving the linear equation
eM e−10 x ≡ Bi (mod n), Bi = Ei/ni, (4.5)
Ei ≡ C −
i−1∑
j=0
njDj(M0,M1, . . . ,Mj)
−niD′i(M0,M1, . . . ,Mi−1) (mod ni+1).
Inductively, we can decrypt all plaintexts M1,M2, . . . ,Mk−1.
Here, we describe the decryption program written in the pidgin ALGOL in the
following. For x ∈ Z and positive integer N , [x]N will denote the remainder of x
modulo N , which is in {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}.
procedure Nk Decryption:
INPUT: d, n, C(:= [(M0 + nM1 + . . .+ n
k−1Mk−1)e]nk)
OUTPUT: M0,M1, . . . ,Mk−1
(1) C0 := [C]n;
M0 := [C
d
0 ]n;
(2) D0 := [M
e
0 ]n2 ;
E1 := [C −D0]n2 ;
B1 := E1/n in Z;
A := [(eC0)
−1M0]n;
M1 := [AB1]n;
(3) FOR i = 2 to (k − 1)
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begin
SUM := 0;
FOR j = 0 to (i− 1) do
begin
Dj := [Dj(M0,M1, . . . ,Mj)]ni+1 ;
SUM := [SUM + njDj]ni+1
end
D′i := [D
′
i(M0,M1, . . . ,Mi−1)]ni+1 ;
Ei := [C − SUM− niD′i]ni+1 ;
Bi := Ei/n
i in Z;
Mi := [ABi]n
end
4.2.3 Permutation
Let S be a finite set, and let F (x) be a function from S to S. The function F (x) is
called a permutation function if every pair x, y ∈ S that satisfies F (x) = F (y) also
satisfies x = y. If the encryption function F (x) is not a permutation, we cannot
uniquely decrypt a ciphertext. It is known that the encryption function of the RSA
cryptosystem is a permutation, if and only if the relation GCD(e, L) = 1 holds
with the same notation as in section 4.2.1. In the previous section, we showed that
if the conditions GCD(e, L) = 1 and GCD(e, n) = 1 are satisfied, the proposed
cryptosystem can be uniquely decrypted i.e., it is a one-to-one function.
Here, the encryption function of the proposed cryptosystem is defined from Znk
×
to Znk
×. We can prove this function is a permutation if and only if the conditions
GCD(e, L) = 1 and GCD(e, n) = 1 hold.
Actually, the reduced residue group modulo nk such that Znk
× is decomposed into
two products such that
Znk
× ∼= Zpk× × Zqk×. (4.6)
Both groups are cyclic groups whose orders are pk−1(p− 1) and qk−1(q− 1), respec-
tively. Therefore, the order of the group Znk
× is nk−1(p− 1)(q− 1). All elements in
Znk
× are expressed by n-adic expansion such that
M = M0 + nM1 + . . .+ n
k−1Mk−1,
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where M0 ∈ Zn× and M1, . . . ,Mk−1 ∈ Zn. This is the reason that the plaintext
must have the form in equation (4.1).
Let E(x) ≡ xe (mod nk) be the encryption function of the proposed cryptosystem.
Suppose E(x) ≡ E(y) (mod nk), and we get (x/y)e ≡ 1 (mod nk). By Chinese
remainder theorem, we reduce the equation into modulo pk. Let g be a primitive
root of modulo pk, and let x/y ≡ gj (mod pk) for some j. We get gje ≡ 1 (mod pk),
and
je ≡ 0 (mod pk−1(p− 1)).
If E(x) is a permutation, this equation must be solvable and all solutions are differ-
ent, so GCD(e, p) = 1 and GCD(e, (p− 1)) = 1 holds. Therefore, we have to choose
e such that GCD(e, n) = 1 and GCD(e, L) = 1. The criteria in the key generation
of the proposed cryptosystem are necessary.
4.2.4 Security
4.1. Theorem When plaintexts are uniformly distributed, finding the entire plain-
text from the ciphertext for the RSA cryptosystem is as intractable as doing it for
the proposed n-adic RSA-type cryptosystem.
Proof: Using a black-box which can decipher the RSA cryptosystem, we can de-
cipher the first block. Moreover, we can also decrypt blocks after the first one by
using the decryption algorithm in section 4.2.2, so the entire plaintext is deciphered.
Conversely, we are given ciphertext C, which is the result of encrypting a random M
(mod n) by the RSA cryptosystem. Let C ′ be a random n-adic ciphertext, whose
plaintext M ′ satisfies M ′ ≡M (mod n). All the bits of M ′ are uniquely distributed
since M is random, and we can use the black box for the n-adic system to recover
M ′. Hence, we can decipher the plaintext M .
All the attacks against the RSA cryptosystem (See, for example, [MvOV97] [KR95].)
are also applicable to the proposed system, because if we can decipher the first block
M0, then we can recover all the following blocks using relationships (4.4) or (4.5).
Here, we wonder whether the proposed cryptosystem has extra flaws in terms of
using a non-square modulo nk. The attacks that might break it are the message
concealing [BB79] and the cycling attacks [WS79]. In the following two sections, we
show these attacks never work against the proposed cryptosystem.
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4.2.5 Message concealing
A function F (x) is called unconcealed when F (x) = x holds for all x. If a function
of a cryptosystem is unconcealed, then we cannot encrypt any message by it. G. R.
Blakley and I. Borosh showed that the encryption function of the RSA cryptosystem
is unconcealed [BB79]. Let N be the number of residue classes x modulo nk such
that xe ≡ x (mod nk). They proved
N = (1 + GCD(e− 1, pk−1(p− 1)))(1 + GCD(e− 1, qk−1(q − 1))).
If GCD(e − 1, pq) > 1 holds, then N becomes very large. We have to choose the
system parameters p, q and e described in section 4.2.1 to preclude this failure. It
must be noted that if e is selected smaller than p and q, then GCD(e − 1, pq) = 1
holds.
Moreover, they also showed that if e is an odd integer larger than 2, then N = 9 if
and only if
GCD(e− 1, λ) = 2, λ = LCM((p− 1)pk−1, (q − 1)qk−1).
For example, the RSA cryptosystem has only 9 unconcealed messages if GCD(e −
1, L) = 2. For small e, we have GCD(e − 1, pq) = 1, and N for the proposed
cryptosystem is equal to that of the RSA cryptosystem.
4.2.6 Cycling attacks
It is known that the RSA cryptosystem is broken without factoring n when a ci-
phertext C has a period such that CP (b) ≡ 1 (mod n), where P (t) is a polynomial
and t = b is an integer. Actually, if the relation holds, the plaintext can be re-
covered by computing M ≡ CQ (mod n), where Q satisfies eQ ≡ 1 (mod P ′) and
P ′ = P (b)/GCD(e, P (b)). Moreover, this analysis is true even if the modulo n is
changed to nk. To break the proposed n-adic RSA-type cryptosystem, an attacker
would have to find the polynomial P (t) and the value t = b, which have the relation
CP (b) ≡ 1 (mod nk). By decomposing of the group Znk like (4.6), we reduce the
relations to
P (t) ≡ 0 (mod pi), P (t) ≡ 0 (mod qi) (i = 1, 2), (4.7)
where p1 = p; p2 = q; and qi is a large prime such that qi|pi − 1(i = 1, 2). H.
C. Williams and B. Schmid [WS79] showed that the possibility of this polynomial
satisfying equation (4.7) is very small, unless P (t) = t ± 1 and t = em. Therefore,
the designers must make m very large to preclude this attack. One method is to
have qi − 1 and pi − 1 be divisible by large primes ri and r′i such that ri|pi − 1
and r′i|qi − 1; then ri|m and r′i|m hold for i = 1, 2 and m becomes very large.
Since pi − 1(i = 1, 2) must be divisible by a large prime to prevent the factoring
algorithm called Pollard’s p− 1 method, we do not need worry about the equations
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em ≡ ±1 (mod pi). Consequently, the proposed n-adic RSA-type cryptosystem is
secure against this attack according to the same treatment as used for the original
RSA cryptosystem.
4.2.7 Running time
Here, we discuss the running time of the proposed cryptosystem. In the encryption
process, we have to compute the e-th power modulo nk(k ≥ 2). As k increases, the
running time becomes longer. However, it is possible to make the exponent of the
encryption e small, since considering the low exponent attacks [CFPR96] [Cop96]
[Ha88], the encryption cost is not so expensive.
Next, we consider the decryption process. The first block is decrypted by the same
algorithm as in the RSA cryptosystem, and we should make the exponent d as
large as the public modulus n to avoid Wiener’s attack [Wie90]. Therefore, the
decryption of the first block is the most expensive task. After the first block, we
have to generate linear equation (4.4) and maybe also (4.5), and solve it/them. The
ciphertext Ci(i ≥ 1) is expressed by the polynomial of Mi(i ≥ 1) and the task of
computing the polynomial is essentially to calculate M e0 . Therefore, it costs the
same as the encryption process to generate the linear equations. Solving a linear
equation is fast, so the decryption time after the first block also becomes as fast as
the encryption process. If we choose a very small e, this algorithm becomes very
efficient. For example, let the number of blocks be two. We can generate the linear
equation to compute equation (4.4), which are at most 2blog2 ec multiplications
modulo n2 and one division of n2, and to solve it, which are two multiplications
modulo n and one inversion modulo n.
On the other hand, several multi-block RSA-type cryptosystems have been pro-
posed [Dem94] [KMOV92] [LKBS92]. Their decryption time is l times slower than
the original RSA cryptosystem, where l is the number of blocks. Our proposed cryp-
tosystem is much faster than these cryptosystems, as showed by the above analysis.
1
4.2.8 Effectiveness
As we discussed in the previous sections, the proposed n-adic RSA-type cryptosys-
tem has several effective features. The most significant points are being as hard as
breaking the original RSA cryptosystem and providing fast decryption for messages
longer than the public key n.
1K. Koyama proposed a two-block cryptosystem having fast decryption by using singular cubic
curves. But it only has two blocks [Koy95].
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By the way, the RSA cryptosystem is slower than the secret-key cryptosystem, so
the RSA cryptosystem is used to encrypt a session key of the secret-key cryptosys-
tem to overcome this disadvantage. However, its theoretical security level must be
estimated from the RSA cryptosystem and the secret-key. We do not have to use
the secret-key cryptosystem, if the length of the data is shorter than a public-key n.
For a message that is several times longer than the public-key n, our proposed n-
adic RSA-type cryptosystem is very efficient. We can encrypt such a message much
faster.
Moreover, it is expected that the encryption speed of the RSA cryptosystem will
reach 1 Mbits/second within a year or so [RSAFAQ]. The proposed method can
contribute to the attainment of the fast encryption speed.
4.2.9 Implementation data of Nk cryptosystem
In order to demonstrate the improved efficiency of our decryption, we implemented
our scheme using the LiDIA library [LiD95]. It should be emphasized here that our
implementation was not optimized for cryptographic purposes — it is only intended
to provide a comparison between the RSA cryptosystem and the Nk cryptosystem.
The results are shown in table 4.1.
RSA Nk cryptosystem (k = 2) Nk cryptosystem (k = 3)
Encryption 1.14 ms 4.27 ms 9.51 ms
Decryption 118.68 ms 125.10 ms 136.25 ms
Table 4.1: Average timings for the Nk cryptosystem compared to RSA cryptosystem
with a 1024-bit modulus n and e = 216 + 1 for over 1000 randomly chosen pairs of
primes of the specified size on a Celeron 500 MHz using the LiDIA library
4.3 The Nk Rabin cryptosystem
In this section, we describe how to extend the Rabin cryptosystem using n-adic
expansion. The discussion is similar to the extension of the RSA cryptosystem.
4.3.1 Algorithm
1. Generating keys: Generate two appropriate primes p, q, and let n = pq. Here,
p and q are the secret keys, and n is the public key.
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2. Encryption: Let M0 ∈ Zn× and M1, . . . ,Mk−1 ∈ Zn be the plaintext. We
encrypt the plaintext by
C ≡ (M0 + nM1 + . . .+ nk−1Mk−1)2 (mod nk). (4.8)
And we send the ciphertext C.
3. Decryption: We solve the modular quadratic equation
x2 ≡ C (mod nk). (4.9)
Then the solutions are just plaintext M0,M1, . . . ,Mk−1.
4.3.2 Details of decryption
First, we decrypt the first block M0. We solve the quadratic equation C ≡ M20
modulo primes p and q. Here, several algorithms to solve the quadratic equation
modulo a prime p are known, and the fastest one can be computed in sub-quadratic
polynomial time [KS95]. Next, we decrypt the first block of the plaintext M0 by the
Chinese remainder theorem. The degree of ambiguity is 4 for the decryption modulo
n, because we have two solutions of each quadratic equation. And we can eliminate
the ambiguousness by adding redundancy bits, and we can get the true plaintext.
Next, we discuss the decryption of the remaining blocks M1,M2, . . . , Mk−1. The
process is similar to the case in the RSA cryptosystem. For M1, we have the linear
equation modulo n2,
M20 + 2nM0x ≡ C (mod n2). (4.10)
And this equation is solvable because 2M0 ∈ (Z/nZ)×, and the solution is M1. Here,
assume that we already decrypt M0,M1, . . . ,Mi−1, and we can uniquely decrypt Mi
by solving
2niM0x ≡ C −
l+m≤i∑
0≤l,m≤i−1
nl+mMlMm (mod n
i+1), (4.11)
Therefore, we can decrypt all plaintext blocks M0,M1,M2, . . . ,Mk−1.
We describe the decryption program written in the pidgin ALGOL in the following.
For x ∈ Z and positive integer N , [x]N will denote the remainder of x modulo N ,
which is {0, 1, . . . , N − 1}.
procedure Nk Rabin Decryption:
INPUT: p, q, n, C(:= [(M0 + nM1 + . . .+ n
k−1Mk−1)2]nk)
OUTPUT: M0,M1, . . . ,Mk−1
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(1) C0 := [C]n;
decrypt M0 using p, q, C0;
(2) FOR i = 1 to (k − 1) do
begin
SUM := 0;
FOR l = 0 to (i− 1) do
FOR m = 0 to (i− 1) do
WHILE l +m ≤ i do
begin
D := [nl+mMlMm]ni+1 ;
SUM := [SUM +D]ni+1
end
Ei := [C − SUM]ni+1 ;
Bi := Ei/n
i in Z;
Mi := [(2M0)
−1Bi]n
end
4.3.3 Security
4.2. Theorem Completely breaking the proposed n-adic Rabin-type cryptosystem is
as intractable as factoring.
Proof: Let p, q be primes, and let n = pq. The complexities of the following three
algorithms only differ by polynomial time.
(I) to factor n = pq
(II) to find the solution of the quadratic equation modulo n
(III) to find the solution of the quadratic equation modulo nk,
where k is an integer greater than 2. (I) and (II) are clearly equivalent because the
security of the Rabin cryptosystem is the same as factoring [Ra79]. (III) ⇒ (II)
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is true by reducing the solution in (II) modulo n. (II) ⇒ (III) is true because it
is just the decryption process after the first block in the previous section, and the
algorithm only takes polynomial time to generate and solve linear equations. Here,
(III) is just the algorithm deciphering the proposed n-adic system.
The exponent of the Rabin cryptosystem is only 2, so the low exponent attacks are
applicable to it [CFPR96] [Cop96] [Ha88]. However, we can preclude these attacks
by padding a plaintext with random bits.
4.3.4 Running time and effectiveness
Here, we discuss the running time of the proposed cryptosystem. In the encryption
process, we only compute the second power modulo nk(k ≥ 2), which is very fast.
For the decryption process, the first block is decrypted by the same decryption
method as for the Rabin cryptosystem. The decryption of the first block is the most
expensive task. After the first block, we have to generate the linear equation (4.10)
and maybe also (4.11), and solve it/them. These are computed very fast, and the
cost is very small compared with the cost of decrypting the first block. Therefore,
the total cost of the decryption is essentially the cost of the first block.
On the other hand, several multi-block Rabin-type cryptosystems have been pro-
posed [MM96] [SE96]. We have to solve a polynomial with more than two degrees
over the finite field of a prime order. Solving polynomials of higher degree is more
expensive than solving a quadratic polynomial, and makes the decryption process
ambiguous and restricts the form of the secret primes. These cryptosystems have
few advantages.
From the above analysis, our proposed cryptosystem is much faster than these cryp-
tosystems, and easy to implement. Designers do not have to code a complicated
algorithm and can use only ordinary mathematical tools such as the greatest com-
mon divisor.
As we discussed in section 4.2.8, for messages that are several times longer than
the public-key n, our proposal n-adic Rabin cryptosystem is very efficient. We can
encrypt a message with the running time of the first block.
4.4 Open problems and a partial solution
A plaintext of the proposed n-adic cryptosystem modulo nk has the form M ≡
M0 + nM1 + . . . + n
k−1Mk−1. Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 show that breaking the entire
plaintext M is as hard as breaking the RSA cryptosystem or factoring. Here, we
mention some problems concerning the security of each block M0,M1, . . . ,Mk−1.
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If we have an algorithm that breaks the first block M0, we can decipher the RSA
or Rabin cryptosystem. However, it is an open problem whether you can find the
blocks after the first one without deciphering the first block. One strategy for
finding such an algorithm is to seek some algebraic relations between a ciphertext
and blocks after the first one. Indeed, the most trivial relation is linear equation
(4.4) or (4.5) whose solutions are the remaining blocks after the first one. But, we
have to compute the value M e−10 to construct them, which is as hard as deciphering
the RSA cryptosystem.
W. Alexi et al. showed that we can find the whole plaintext by using an algorithm
that deciphers certain bits of the plaintext [ACGS88]. This also means that the
proposed n-adic system can be broken by an algorithm that deciphers certain bits
of the first block of the plaintext. It is an open problem whether there exists an
algorithm that can decipher certain bits after first block of the plaintext.
Against the RSA cryptosystem, D. Coppersmith et al. showed that we can recover
the original plaintext by algebraic calculation, if we send two ciphertexts whose
plaintexts have a polynomial relationship [CFPR96]. It might be possible to recover
the plaintext of the proposed n-adic system using a variation of this technique. It
is an open problem whether you can recover the plaintext if there is a polynomial
relationship between some blocks of one plaintext or between blocks of two plain-
texts.
4.4.1 Security of the second block
4.3. Theorem Consider the n-adic RSA-type cryptosystem. Let O be an oracle
which, given a ciphertext C ≡ (M0 + nM1 + . . . + nk−1Mk−1)e (mod nk), answers
the second block of the plaintext M1. The oracle O can be used to break the entire
plaintext (M0,M1, . . . ,Mk−1).
Proof: If we can decipher the first block M0, then we can also do all the remain-
ing blocks M2, . . . ,Mk−1. Therefore, we can reduce the attack to the case of the
two-block cryptosystem with modulo n2. Let the plaintext M = M0 + nM1 (0 ≤
M0,M1 < n), and C ≡ M e (mod n2) be the ciphertext. For i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , h,
expand
2iM ≡M (i)0 + nM (i)1 (mod n2), 0 < M (i)0 ,M (i)1 < n,
where h = blog2 nc. Here, 2ieC ≡ (M (i)0 + nM (i)1 )e (mod n2) holds, and we can
get each second block M
(i)
1 = O(2ieC) by using the oracle O. Here, note that
M
(i)
0 < n/2 if and only if 2M
(i)
1 (mod n) = M
(i+1)
1 for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , h. Hence 2M
(i)
1
(mod n) = O(2(i+1)eC) if and only if M (i)0 < n/2 for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , h. On the other
hand, let C0 ≡ C (mod n), and we have 2ieC0 ≡ (2iM0)e ≡ (M (i)0 )e (mod n) for
i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , h. This observation means that we can construct the half bit oracle
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OH , which computes OH(2ieC0) = 0 if M (i)0 < n/2 and OH(2ieC0) = 1 if M (i)0 > n/2.
Indeed, define that
OH(2ieC0) =
{
0, (2O(2ieC) (mod n)) = O(2(i+1)eC),
1, (2O(2ieC) (mod n)) 6= O(2(i+1)eC),
for i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , h. It is well-known this half bit oracle OH recovers the plaintext
M0 such that C0 ≡ M e0 (mod n)[GMT82]. Consequently, we can decipher the first
block M0.
4.5 Conclusion
Our proposed n-adic extensions of the RSA and Rabin cryptosystems perform de-
cryption faster than any other multi-block RSA-type or Rabin-type cryptosystems
ever reported. Deciphering the entire plaintext of this system is as intractable as
breaking the original RSA cryptosystem or factoring. We also showed that the pro-
posed n-adic RSA-type cryptosystem is a permutation function, and showed the
criteria for message concealing and cycling attacks which are applicable to the RSA
cryptosystem. Even if a message is several times longer than a public-key n, we can
encrypt it fast without repeatedly using the secret-key cryptosystem.
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